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Since at least the 1930s, when Schumpeter proposed his creative destruction 
hypothesis and defined entrepreneurship as activities that involve different types of 
innovation, entrepreneurship has been generally framed as a positive phenomenon in 
societies. Such positive bias toward entrepreneurship is mainly because of its known 
positive effects on economic development and prosperity in a country (e.g. Reynolds, 
Hay, & Camp, 1999; Zacharakis, Shepherd, & Bygrave, 2000). However, more recently, 
scholars have noticed that entrepreneurship does not always include innovations in 
productive ways as Schumpeter suggested (new product, new process, new supply, new 
market, and new organizing method), but can also include innovations in unproductive 
forms, including “innovations in rent-seeking procedures, for example, discovery of a 
previously unused legal gambit that is effective in diverting rents to those who are first in 
exploiting it” (Baumol, 1990, p. 897).  
Research on factors that promote entrepreneurship in a society, especially in its 
productive forms, has attracted significant attention in different fields of knowledge, 
including economics, sociology, and entrepreneurship scholarship (e.g. Sobel, 2008). A 
major research stream in this area is the study of institutions and their influence on 
entrepreneurial efforts within different societies (North, 1990; Scott, 1995; 
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Acemoglu, 1995). Institutions are rules of the game that constrain or promote certain types of 
behaviors and interactions among people in a society (Hira & Hira, 2000). Hence, institutions 
can encourage/discourage people to engage in productive or unproductive forms of 
entrepreneurial behaviors (Baumol, 1990; Murphy, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1991). For example, 
Sobel (2008) demonstrates that better institutional frameworks (e.g., more secure property 
right regime, more balanced and fair judicial system, stronger contract enforcement, etc.) 
promote productive entrepreneurship (higher venture capital investments, higher rate of 
patents, faster rate of sole proprietorship growth, and higher establishment birth rates) and 
reduce unproductive entrepreneurship activities (lobbying activity and legal quality/lawsuit) 
within different states of the US. 
Prior research has mostly focused on effects of formal institutions (written rules, 
regulations, laws, etc.) on productive entrepreneurship (Bruton, Ahlstrom, & Li, 2010). 
Secure property rights, fair judiciary systems, strong enforcement agencies, and efficient tax 
codes are a few examples of formal institutions that are known to have positive effects on the 
level of productive entrepreneurship in a country. In contrast, with exception of national 
culture, research on effects of other informal institutions (social norms, beliefs, values, etc.) 
on entrepreneurship, especially in its unproductive forms, has attracted much less attention 
among scholars (Bruton et al., 2010). This study seeks to contribute in filling these gaps of 
knowledge by explaining how cronyism, as an understudied informal institution, influences 
the level of people’s involvement in both productive and unproductive forms of 
entrepreneurship in a country. 
Cronyism refers to the act of favoritism among members of a network based on their 
connections and mostly at the expense of outsiders. More accurately, cronyism as a practice 
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refers to “a reciprocal exchange transaction where party A shows favor to party B based on 
shared membership in a social network at the expense of party C's equal or superior claim to 
the valued resource.” (Khatri, Tsang, & Begley, 2006, p. 62). Cronyism refers to both private 
favoritism and public favoritism (government-business relationship). Private favoritism 
happens in a purely private domain between two parties (for example, in an organizational 
setting between managers and employees), however, public power is at stake in public 
favoritism, meaning that, one party abuses public power to give/receive favors to/from 
another party, possibly at the expense of a specific third party or public interest (Li, 2009). 
Once cronyism becomes a dominant practice in a business context, it functions as a strong 
informal institution, either as a cognitive belief (the common/safe path for success) or as a 
normative belief (how things are getting done around here).       
Prevalence of cronyism in a context leads to the emergence of an economic system, 
called crony capitalism, in which business performance depends on political connections 
rather than market forces (Holcombe, 2013; Sobel & Graefe-Anderson, 2014). In a crony 
capitalism system, cronyism, especially in its public form between bureaucrats and 
businesses, is a dominant business practice and “those close to the political authorities who 
make and enforce policies receive favors that have large economic value” (Haber, 2002, p. 
xii). Therefore, connected economic players have unfair advantages over their un-connected 
competitors. In other words, in such an economic system, ‘what firms do’ is much less 
important than ‘whom firms know’ (Guseva, 2007). In extreme cases of crony capitalism, 
using networks to acquire resources and access opportunities is not just a supporting factor 
for business performance, but the only way for achieving business goals, such that without 
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benefiting from cronyism the survival of a firm is quite unlikely. This is described as the 
“downside of social networking” (Khatri, Tsang, & Begley, 2003). 
Cronyism is considered as the “downside of social networking” (Khatri et al., 2003) 
not only because of its tendency to constrain success paths in a society, but also because it 
restricts the opportunities for building ‘right networks’ to certain individuals and groups 
within a society. Cronyism mostly happens based on relations such as kinship or friendship 
that are not available to everyone in a society. Hence, crony capitalism’s problem is that 
having the ‘right networks’ is excessively important for business performance (such that it 
cannot be substituted by anything else), and that not everybody has an equal chance to build 
those ‘right networks’. Consequently, cronyism leads to an unfair access of certain groups of 
people to resources and opportunities in a business context, at the expense of other people 
who cannot or do not participate in this favor seeking/offering game.  
Cronyism was first used in a political context in 1952 by a New York Times’ 
journalist to describe Truman administration’s act of appointing employees within the 
official postal administration, based on friendships rather than qualifications (Turhan, 2014). 
Yet, cronyism did not attract scholars’ attention until it was recognized as one of the major 
causes of the economic crisis and fall of the East Asian economies in mid 1990s (e.g. Rasiah, 
1998; Wade, 1998; Henderson, 1999; Enderwick, 2005). Hence, it has not been until recently 
that economists started to investigate the economic consequences of cronyism in different 
contexts (e.g. Haber, 2002; Kang, 2002; Enderwick, 2005; Khatri et al., 2006; Holcombe, 
2013). In management scholarship, there are very few studies that have focused on cronyism 
(e.g. Khatri et al., 2006), however, there are numerous studies on political connections and 
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networking that help to form a basic understanding about cronyism’s effect on organizational 
performance.       
Prior research findings indicate that cronyism has a wide range of economic 
consequences. Cronyism’s effects are different based on the level of analysis and time frame. 
At the organizational level, most scholars have studied the effects of political connections on 
firms’ performance, with underlying assumption that political connections lead to favoritism. 
The general belief is that having political connections benefits firm’s overall performance, 
especially when firms are small and at the earlier stages of their development (e.g. Li & 
Zhang, 2007; Li, Meng, Wang, & Zhou, 2008; Xin & Pearce, 1996; Zhou, 2013). However, 
cronyism’s long-term effects are uncertain and can be even detrimental to firm’s 
performance. Firm’s engagement in cronyism undermines its ability to plan for the long-term 
and diverts its efforts to political rent seeking instead of developing sustainable core 
competencies and competitive advantages (Enderwick, 2005; Tahoun, 2014).  
Similarly, cronyism’s economic effects are different for countries at different stages 
of development, such that, cronyism may have some short-term benefits for countries at 
earlier stages of development, but its cost increases significantly in the long-run as countries 
become more developed (Shleifer &Vishny, 1994). In developed economies, cronyism slows 
down the economic growth by restricting economic freedom, producing barriers to entry, 
increasing lobbying efforts, and disrupting market competitions (Smith & Sutter, 2012). 
However, in developing countries, cronyism is often considered as a pragmatic second best 
solution to government’s credible commitment problem (making sure that government will 
not usurp private property rights while it has the right to distribute and protect private 
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property right) and makes economic growth possible in the short term (Aligica & Tarko, 
2014).  
Additionally, cronyism has several social and political consequences. Cronyism is a 
major cause for higher levels of income inequality in a society since it transfers wealth to 
connected elites at the expense of the public (Walder, 2002). This wealth redistribution leads 
to deadweight loss1 in a society as it increases rent seeking behaviors, such that, what elites 
gain is much less than what the public lose (Mitchell, 2013). Moreover, widespread cronyism 
makes unfairness pervasive, promotes narrow self-interest among citizens, and undermines 
ethical standards in a society. Hence, widespread cronyism increases different types of 
corrupt behaviors in a society and exhaust people’s trust in fairness and functionality of the 
system (Anokhin & Schulze, 2009).  
Cronyism promotes political authoritarianism by suppressing political competitions 
and aligning countries’ resources to support the status quo (Morck & Yeung, 2004). Once 
cronyism has become a widespread practice, businesses find no better option than to engage 
in political rent seeking, “self-interested dealings between the political and business elites” 
(Morck & Yeung, 2004, p. 391), and gain profit through politicians’ favoritism in exchange 
for supporting those politicians to stay in power (Holcombe, 2013). Consequently, politicians 
and favored businesses get locked into a situation of mutual dependency, called mutual 
hostage problem, in which, change by one part threatens the position of the other part 
(Enderwick, 2005).  
                                                          
1-Deadweight loss, also known as excess burden or allocative inefficiency, refers to costs to society resulted 
from market inefficiencies. Deadweight loss happens when supply and demand are out of equilibrium. 
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A quite understudied consequence of cronyism at the country level is its effect on 
entrepreneurial activities. Several scholars posit that the most destructive effect of cronyism 
is its tendency to discourage corporate restructuring and innovative economic behaviors (e.g., 
Enderwick, 2005). However, there is no study that delves deep into the relationship between 
cronyism and entrepreneurship at the national level and tests how widespread cronyism 
influences entrepreneurial activities in different countries. The main focus of this research is 
to investigate how the degree of prevalence of cronyism in a society influences 
entrepreneurship in that society. 
This study aims to investigate the effects of cronyism on entrepreneurial behaviors 
and explain how cronyism influences entrepreneurship at national level. In other words, this 
research strives to find answers for two major questions: 1) how does the degree of 
prevalence of cronyism in a country influence the level of productive/unproductive 
entrepreneurship in that country? 2) How do the levels of market competition and 
institutional trust mediate the relationship between cronyism and productive/unproductive 
entrepreneurship within a country? For this purpose, I adopt an institutional perspective 
(North, 1990; Scott, 1995) and build my theoretical explanations based on Baumol’s (1990) 
model of productive, unproductive/destructive entrepreneurship.  
Productive Entrepreneurship (PE) refers to activities that increase the innovativeness, 
adaptability, and dynamicity of an economy, and create wealth for entrepreneurs and their 
society (Baumol, 1990; 1996; Sobel, 2008; Douhan & Henrekson, 2008). Examples include 
product/service innovations, business model innovations, commercialization of new 
technologies, and establishment of new firms. In contrast, Unproductive Entrepreneurship 
(UE) refers to unproductive innovative activities that mostly destroy wealth in an economy 
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and results in positive returns for certain individuals at the expense of other individuals and 
society (Baumol, 1990; 1996). Examples include rent seeking activities such as lobbying 
efforts, organized crimes, lawsuit abuse, and other types of redistributive activities (North, 
1990; Baumol, 1990; 1996; Douhan & Henrekson, 2008).  
Baumol’s (1990) main thesis is that rules of the game, institutions, determine the 
rewards for involvement in productive and unproductive entrepreneurship efforts in each 
context and people choose to engage in productive or unproductive entrepreneurship by 
considering the relative return that each type of entrepreneurship provides for them. Based on 
this framework, this study explains how widespread cronyism acts as an informal rule of the 
game that influence the reward structure for economic activities in a country and encourages 
individuals in a country to get involved in unproductive entrepreneurship and discourages 
them from involvement in productive entrepreneurship (Murphy et al., 1991). 
Moreover, this study suggests two mediators for the direct relationships between 
cronyism and productive/unproductive entrepreneurial activities in a country. Cronyism leads 
to different types of entry barriers for non-favored firms to the benefit of favored firms. 
Connected firms strive to make it more difficult for would-be competitors to enter the 
market, and they are often favored by receiving monopoly powers or other types of privileges 
to stay ahead of others in the market (Mitchell, 2013). Such lack of market-based competition 
in a business context decreases the incentives for involvement in PE and promotes UE. 
Therefore, market competition is one mediator for direct link between cronyism and 
productive/unproductive entrepreneurship at national level. 
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The other factor that mediates the direct relationship between cronyism and 
productive/unproductive entrepreneurship is institutional trust. Institutional trust refers to the 
“wide-spread confidence that office holders and others who are directly and indirectly party 
to a transaction will, regardless of their identity, impartially and fairly enforce the rules that 
govern exchange” (Anokhin & Schulze, 2009, p. 3). Prevalence of cronyism among 
businesses and between businesses and governments hurts credibility of the parties involved 
(Mitchell, 2013). Through repeated interactions with businesses and government, potential 
entrepreneurs learn the rules of the game and whether they can count on fairness and 
neutrality of institutions or if they need to engage in cronyism if they want to achieve their 
goals. Therefore, prevalence of cronyism leads to citizens’ skepticism about the ability and 
intention of market institutions to reliably and neutrally enforce trade rules. Lack of trust in 
institutions drives a country’s individuals away from PE toward UE, since they strive to 
ensure that they can reap the benefits of their own talents.  
The study utilizes secondary data from multiple sources to build appropriate measures 
for its desired constructs. These data sources include: Global Competitiveness Index reported 
by World Economic Forum (Sala-I-Martin et al., 2010), Worldwide Governance Indicators 
developed by World Bank Groups (Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2010), World Bank 
Group Entrepreneurship Survey (WBGES), World Development Indicators developed by 
World Bank Groups, and Corruption Perception Index reported by Transparency 
International (Lambsdorff, 2008). The results of SEM analysis on data from 132 countries 
provide strong support for most parts of the study’s conceptual model. The study finds 
empirical support for the direct negative effect of cronyism on PE, direct positive effect of 
cronyism on UE, and mediated paths from cronyism to PE/UE through institutional trust. 
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However, the results indicate that market competition mediates the influence of cronyism on 
PE, but fails to support the mediated path between cronyism and UE through market 
competition.    
Understanding the effects of cronyism on entrepreneurship at national level is 
important because of the significant implications of productive and unproductive 
entrepreneurship for countries’ economic growth and prosperity. Cronyism increases 
unproductive entrepreneurial efforts, which can suppress productive entrepreneurial activities 
and lead to more cronyism. Therefore, once countries fall into the “idea trap” of cronyism, as 
a pragmatic way of getting business done, their private and public resources becomes locked 
into the system and they become entangled in a reinforcing vicious cycle that is able to 
destroy or obliterate the whole economy of a country in the long run.  
Consequently, scholars need to study cronyism, its antecedents and consequences at 
different levels of analysis, and mechanisms through which it works, so that they can suggest 
effective solutions to limit the practice of cronyism in a business context. This study is one of 
very few studies that recently focused on the issue of cronyism. The study contributes in this 
area of knowledge by providing a comprehensive overview of cronyism’s literature and 
developing a research model that elaborates on relationships between cronyism and 
entrepreneurial activities in a national context. 
This study has several theoretical and practical contributions. Firstly, it contributes to 
recent body of research that is forming around the issue of cronyism. This study is among the 
very first studies that present a comprehensive overview of the literature on cronyism and 
highlight areas that require more attention by researchers. For example, research on 
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antecedents of cronyism in a business context has attracted very little attention. This study 
reviews this literature and suggests a novel institutional framework that can be implemented 
by future researchers to investigate different antecedents of cronyism in a society. Moreover, 
this research suggests a new way to measure cronyism, which can be implemented in future 
research to study the consequences of cronyism. The study uses a measure of the ‘perception 
of cronyism’ and argues why perception of cronyism is an appropriate proxy to measure the 
level of cronyism in a country (Smith & Sutter, 2012).  
Moreover, this research contributes to our knowledge about entrepreneurship policy 
and how rules of the game determine the allocation of resources to productive or 
unproductive entrepreneurial efforts in national context. It explains how widespread 
cronyism changes the reward structure in a society and encourages individuals to engage in 
unproductive efforts instead of productive ones. This is among very few studies that aim to 
provide empirical support for Baumol’s (1990) model of productive, unproductive, and 
destructive entrepreneurship (e.g. Sobel, 2008). In addition to clarifying cronyism’s effect on 
allocation of entrepreneurship in a society, this study also explains how cronyism reduces the 
supply of entrepreneurship in a society through its negative effects on entrepreneurial 
motivation and intention in a country. 
Additionally, this study contributes to the previous literature on the effects of 
networks on entrepreneurial activities. For more than three decades, scholars have 
emphasized the positive role of networking for business performance. The general consensus 
is that having social networks (whether dense networks of strong ties or sparse networks of 
weak ties with many structural holes) provides competitive advantages for firms and supports 
entrepreneurial growth in almost every context (Burt, 1992; Coleman, 1988, 1990; Singh, 
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Hills, Hybels, & Lumpkin, 1999). More recent findings even suggest that social networks can 
substitute for the lack of well-functioning formal institutions, especially in developing 
countries’ context (e.g. Puffer, McCarthy, & Boisot, 2010). However, there are relatively 
very few studies on the “downside of social networking” or cronyism (Khatri et al., 2003). A 
study of cronyism highlights the fact that prevalence of certain types of networking activities 
can be detrimental to productive entrepreneurship efforts in the society as a whole.  
Finally, this research’s findings inform and warn policy makers and businessmen 
about the negative consequences of cronyism for long term economic growth and prosperity 
of a society. Moreover, it provides them with an understanding of how these effects take 
place. Therefore, they are better able to restrict the practice of cronyism by setting 
appropriate policies and corporate governance structures that protect against cronyism. For 
instance, based on this study’s arguments, development of programs and enforcement of 
policies that aim to promote market competitions and institutional trust among citizens can 
help avoid some of the negative consequences of cronyism.  
In the following chapters, first, a comprehensive overview of the literature on 
cronyism is provided. Then, the study’s theoretical frameworks and hypotheses are discussed 
in the third chapter. The fourth chapter explains the study’s methodology and analysis. 





REVIEW OF LITERATURE  
Crony derives from the Greek word ‘Khronios’ (long-lasting) and means “a close 
friend or companion” (Oxford dictionary). In 19th century, cronyism was used to refer to 
the ability and willingness to establish friendships, however, later on in 1952 in the USA, 
a New York Times journalist used cronyism in a political context to describe Truman 
administration’s act of appointing employees within the official postal administration, 
based on friendships rather than qualifications (Turhan, 2014). Consequently, cronyism 
began to be used in political conversations and perceived as favoritism based on 
friendship. 
Currently, cronyism is defined as either a relational or a structural phenomenon 
(Aligica & Tarko, 2014). As an interpersonal or relational phenomenon, cronyism is a 
practice that refers to “a reciprocal exchange transaction where party A shows favor to 
party B based on shared membership in a social network at the expense of party C's equal 
or superior claim to the valued resource.” (Khatri et. al., 2006, p. 62). In simple words, 
cronyism is a practice of favoritism based on social ties. Oxford dictionary defines 
cronyism as “the appointment of friends and associates to positions of authority, without 
proper regard to their qualifications” (Oxford dictionary). Cronyism as a practice is 
contrary to meritocracy. 
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As a structural or systemic phenomenon, cronyism refers to an economic system 
“in which those close to the political authorities who make and enforce policies receive 
favors that have large economic value” (Haber, 2002, p. xii). In other words, cronyism 
describes an economic system in which business success depends on political 
connections rather than market forces (Holcombe, 2013; Sobel & Graefe-Anderson, 
2014). Such a system is also called ‘Crony Capitalism’. In crony capitalism, private firms 
build and leverage their social networks with politicians to influence public power to 
their own advantages (Smith & Sutter, 2012). Cambridge dictionary defines crony 
capitalism as an “economic system in which family members and friends of government 
officials and business leaders are given unfair advantages in the form of jobs, loans, etc.” 
(Cambridge dictionary). In simple words, crony capitalism is an economic system in 
which cronyism is a common practice.  
In this chapter, I further elaborate on these two interpretations of cronyism. Next, 
I explain about distinction between cronyism and other similar concepts, including, rent 
seeking, and corruption. Then, different forms of cronyism and its major antecedents and 
consequences are discussed.  
Cronyism as a practice       
Table 1 presents several definitions for cronyism as a practice. As a practice, 
cronyism refers to “a reciprocal exchange transaction where party A shows favor to party 
B based on shared membership in a social network at the expense of party C's equal or 
superior claim to the valued resource.” (Khatri et. al., 2006, p. 62). Based on this 
definition, an exchange of favor between two parties is considered to be cronyism once 
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that favor satisfies four criteria: “(1) there must be no immediate return of the favor or 
explicit agreement to return it (2) something of value must be given (3) the parties must 
share membership in a social network (4) it must come at a third party's expense.” (Khatri 
et al., 2006, p.70). 
Table 1 – Example Definitions of Cronyism 
Cronyism as a relational phenomenon (Cronyism as a practice) 
The appointment of friends and associates to positions of authority, without proper 
regard to their qualifications (Oxford dictionary) 
The unfair practice by a powerful person (such as a politician) of giving jobs and other 
favors to friends (Merriam – Webster dictionary) 
The situation in which someone important gives jobs to friends rather than to 
independent people who have the necessary skills and experience (Cambridge 
dictionary) 
A reciprocal exchange transaction where party A shows favor to party B based on 
shared membership in a social network at the expense of party C's equal or superior 
claim to the valued resource (Khatri et. al., 2006, p. 62). 
Preferential treatments that members of a network receive due to their social ties and 
not because of their qualifications (Begley et al, 2010, p. 282) 
Favoritism shown by the superior to his or her subordinate based on their relationship, 
rather than the latter’s capability or qualification, in exchange for the latter’s personal 
loyalty (Khatri, & Tsang, 2003, p. 289) 
Favoritism resulting from personal relations and social networks (Turhan, 2013, p. 
296) 
A description of the phenomenon of the exercising of authority in a manner that favors 
friends or associates at the expense of merit (whatever is merit in the relevant context) 
(Mazumdar, 2008, p.2) 
The major theme among different definitions of cronyism is ‘favoritism based on 
network connections’. In other words, cronyism is preferential treatment that members of 
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a network receive due to their social ties and not because of their qualifications (Begley, 
Khatri, & Tsang, 2010). Cambridge dictionary describes cronyism as “the situation in 
which someone important gives jobs to friends rather than to independent people who 
have the necessary skills and experience” (Cambridge dictionary). Consequently, 
cronyism can be defined as the “downside of social networking” (Khatri et al., 2003), 
since it produces unfair advantages for members of a specific network over others. 
Banfield (1958) explains about Southern Italy and Sicily, in which the high importance of 
family loyalty would reinforce the practice of cronyism by forcing people to offer illegal 
favors and preferential treatments to their families. Similarly, Tonoyan and her 
colleagues (2010) posit that reciprocity norms and loyalty to the members’ interest in 
bonding networks such as kinship that tend to exclude outsiders, promote cronyism. 
Cronyism as a practice may occur at any context between any two connected 
members of a network. However, one can differentiate between cronyism that involves 
private favoritism and cronyism that involves public favoritism (government-business 
relationship) (Li, 2009). An example of cronyism that involves private favoritism is 
cronyism at an organizational setting, which is a “favoritism shown by the superior to his 
or her subordinate based on their relationship, rather than the latter’s capability or 
qualification, in exchange for the latter’s personal loyalty” (Khatri & Tsang, 2003, p. 
289). Cronyism that involves private favoritism happens in a purely private domain 
between two private parties, possibly at the expense of a third private party. In contrast, 
in cronyism that involves public favoritism, public power is at stake (Li, 2009), meaning 
that, one party abuses public power to give/receive favors to/from another party, possibly 
at the expense of a specific third party or public interest. The cronyistic relationships 
17  
between government officials and their businessmen cronies are typical examples of 
public favoritism and are typically the main concern of people in a society when they 
discuss cronyism.        
Khatri et al. (2006) adopted social exchange theory (Emerson, 1972; 1981) to 
suggest four different variants of cronyism. Based on social exchange theory, motives 
and relative powers of the parties involved in an exchange relationship influence the 
dynamics of the exchange (Emerson, 1972; Molm & Cook, 1995). Khatri et al. (2006) 
suggest that four different types of cronyism can happen in different combinations of two 
kinds of motives, instrumental or relational, and two types of power relationships, peer or 
hierarchical, of parties involved in cronyism. Instrumental cronyism is primarily 
motivated by task, utilitarian and self-interest factors, as opposed to relational cronyism 
that is instigated by relationship, affection, and loyalty-based factors. Each of these two 
motives may exist in cronyism that either happens between two parties with the same 
level of power, peers, or two parties with an imbalanced power relationship, hierarchical. 
Cronyism as a system (or Crony Capitalism) 
Cronyism as a system, often called crony capitalism, refers to an economic system 
“in which those close to the political authorities who make and enforce policies receive 
favors that have large economic value” (Haber, 2002, p. xii). Oxford dictionary defines 
crony capitalism as “an economic system characterized by close, mutually advantageous 
relationships between business leaders and government officials” (Oxford dictionary). So 
often in the media, crony capitalism is used as an umbrella term to refer to a system 
comprised of a loose collection of related phenomena, such as political favoritism, 
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family-based corporate governance, corruption, collusion, "the old boys club", oligarchy, 
etc. (Mazumdar, 2008). However, as presented in Table 2, the major theme in most 
definitions of crony capitalism is the fact that cronyism, especially in the form of public 
favoritism, is the dominant practice in such a system. In other words, while generally 
speaking crony capitalism may represent a system that includes a group of related 
phenomena, its differentiating point is the fact that cronyism is the main practice in crony 
capitalism, which then promotes other related phenomena. These related phenomena are 
discussed later as major consequences of cronyism.  
Table 2 – Example Definitions of Crony Capitalism  
Crony Capitalism as a structural phenomenon (Crony Capitalism as a system) 
An economic system characterized by close, mutually advantageous relationships between 
business leaders and government officials (Oxford dictionary) 
Economic system in which family members and friends of government officials and business 
leaders are given unfair advantages in the form of jobs, loans, etc. (Cambridge dictionary) 
A term describing an economy in which success in business depends on close relationships 
between business people and government officials. It may be exhibited by favoritism in the 
distribution of legal permits, government grants, special tax breaks, or other forms of state 
interventionism (Wikipedia) 
A description of capitalist society as being based on the close relationships between 
businessmen and the state. Instead of success being determined by a free market and the rule of 
law, the success of a business is dependent on the favoritism that is shown to it by the ruling 
government in the form of tax breaks, government grants and other incentives (Investopedia) 
A system in which success in business is determined by political connections rather than 
market forces … when the normal consumer-driven profit-and-loss signals in an economy are 
significantly distorted through government-granted favors. (Sobel & Graefe-Anderson, 2014, 
p. 1, p. 10) 
[A system] in which those close to the political authorities who make and enforce policies 
receive favors that have large economic value (Haber, 2002, p. xii) 
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A form of capitalism that restricts the allocation of economic resources and opportunity to a 
country’s privileged elite or politically connected cronies [friends] (Enderwick, 2005, p. 117) 
An economic system in which the adjudication of commercial disputes as well as the allocation 
of resources are generally made to favor those who have a close relationship with political 
leaders or government officials (Wei, 2001, p. 16) 
A derogatory or derisive description of the illegitimate use (or abuse) of public authority to 
favour businessmen or business firms who have close relations with those exercising that 
public authority. (Mazumdar, 2008, p.3) 
State incumbent generation of uneven distribution of property rights in favor of a few 
politically-selected firms as a tactic to retain their political power beyond mere self-enrichment 
(Adly, 2009, p.8) 
Aligica & Tarko (2014) suggest that crony capitalism is a distinct type of rent 
seeking society, in addition to the other types of rent seeking societies discussed in the 
literature, namely, classic mercantilism, real life socialism, and state capitalism. They 
argue that in crony capitalism rent seeking structure is legitimized by a populist ideology, 
which is quite different than the ideologies that legitimize other types of rent seeking 
societies (religion and military concerns in mercantilism, utopian socialism in real-life 
socialism, and nationalism in state capitalism). They explain that pragmatism is the main 
legitimizing rhetoric for crony capitalism in which institutions suggest that cronyism is an 
efficient, “middle of the road”, way of getting things done (Aligica & Tarko, 2014). 
Whether to agree with such categorization or not, I submit that the main 
characteristic of crony capitalism, meaning the practice of cronyism, is inevitably present 
in any society to some extent. The fact is that public policies mostly emerge from a 
collective decision making process in which several stakeholders, including businessmen 
and government officials’ cronies, are influential and have the ability to bias the process 
to their own benefit (Arshed, Carter, & Mason, 2014). Moreover, governments are not 
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“omniscient benevolent dictators” who can access unbiased information in every context 
and set fair rules and enforce them unequivocally in every situation (Holcombe, 2013). 
Therefore, policy makers’ and government bureaucrats’ decision making can be partially 
biased by their social networks, either directly through their relationships or indirectly 
through biased information they get from people who are connected to them.  
Such a biased decision making process can result in the emergence of 
policies/decisions that discriminate against some actors and favor others, meaning that, 
some degree of crony capitalism is inevitable in any context. However, other institutions 
are able to either suppress or promote this inevitable level of cronyism in a context. From 
an economic perspective, the important factor is how much the level of cronyism distorts 
competitive market forces and determines economic success in a business context. In a 
purely crony capitalism system, profitability of a business highly depends on its political 
connections (Sobel & Graefe-Anderson, 2014). Businesses have no choice but to engage 
in cronyism, especially with government officials, to survive (Holcombe, 2013). The 
more the business performance in a certain society depends on engagement in cronyism, 
the more crony capitalistic that society is. 
Concluding marks 
In this dissertation, the word ‘cronyism’ is used to refer to the practice of 
cronyism, an exchange of favor between two parties based on their connection at the 
expense of a third party, and the term ‘crony capitalism’ is used to refer to an economic 
system in which cronyism is a common practice. An economic system is considered pure 
crony capitalism if its business performance in that system highly depends on 
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engagement in cronyism. Once consequences of cronyism are discussed in the following 
sections, it becomes clear that other characteristics attributed to crony capitalism 
originate from prevalence of cronyism as a widespread practice in crony capitalism.  
Finally, an important point about the definition of cronyism needs to be 
highlighted here. Cronyism is favoritism based on social ties. Therefore, a practice of 
cronyism includes both favoritism and connection. In prior research, scholars have 
studied cronyism but mostly labeled it either favoritism or connection (e.g. Fisman, 2001; 
Faccio, Masulis, & McConnell, 2006; Franck & Rainer, 2012; Zhou, 2013). However, in 
most cases they assumed that one implies the other, meaning that, connection result in 
favoritism and favoritism happens through connections.  
For instance, Zhou (2013) investigates the effects of political connections on 
entrepreneurial reinvestments in China. He defines politically connected firms as “those 
whose largest owners are closely related to at least one current government official” 
(Zhou, 2013, p. 302) and posits that firms with political connections enjoy higher levels 
of reinvestments because of their facilitated access to resources and opportunities and 
their highly protected property rights. In fact, this is an investigation of cronyism’s effect 
on entrepreneur’s ability to secure reinvestments, but labeled as a political connection 
study that assumes connections result in favoritism.  
This interpretation of cronyism as the simultaneous existence of favoritism and 
connection in practice is in line with Khatri et al.’s (2006) four criteria for cronyism 
definition: “(1) there must be no immediate return of the favor or explicit agreement to 
return it (2) something of value must be given (3) the parties must share membership in a 
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social network (4) it must come at a third party's expense.” (Khatri et al., 2006, p.70). 
Having a connection satisfies criterion (3) and favoritism, defined as “the practice of 
giving unfair preferential treatment to one person or group at the expense of another” 
(Oxford Dictionary), fulfills the other criteria. (1) In favoritism the party who receives a 
favor is not obligated to return it immediately in a specific way, even if he is expected to 
somehow compensate for it in future. Otherwise, it is not described as a favor. (2) 
Obviously favoritism provides some valuable advantageous for receiver of the favor, 
which makes it unfair to others. (4) Favoritism, at least, violates people's right to benefit 
from fair, impartial, and equitable treatments in society. The following sections discuss 
how such a sense of unfairness constrains people’s ambitions and diverts societies’ 
talents toward unproductive entrepreneurial behaviors (Baumol, 1990). Therefore, to 
decide whether a practice is cronyism or not, one needs to look for existence of both 
favoritism and connection in that practice. 
One last point on definition of cronyism is that the connection between two 
parties can be based on any type of social relations, such as family, friendship, ethnicity, 
ideology, religion, workplace, or any other grouping category (Khatri et al., 2003). 
Therefore, cronyism includes different types of favoritism, such as, ethnic favoritism 
(Favoritism based on same ethnicity), political favoritism (favoring others based on their 
similar political view), or family favoritism (also called nepotism referring to 
employment of relatives and family members in same organization (Ford & McLaughlin, 
1986)).  
In next section, differences between cronyism and two similar concepts are 
discussed to further clarify the concept of cronyism.  
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Cronyism and similar concepts 
There are few other concepts in the literature that have large overlaps and are 
often confused with cronyism. Here, the two most similar concepts to cronyism are 
considered to explain the distinction between them and cronyism. Table 3 summarizes 
the main differences between cronyism and these other concepts, namely, rent seeking, 
and corruption. 
Table 3 – Cronyism and Similar Concepts 
Relation to similar concepts 
Rent-seeking  Cronyism involves rent seeking activities, however, there are 
many other types of rent seeking activities that do not involve 
exchange of favors.   
Corruption   Cronyism is mostly legal, however, corruption is always 
illegal. 
 Cronyism is socially expected/accepted in many countries, 
however corruption is socially rejected everywhere. 
 Cronyism can promote different types of corrupt behaviors and 
a corrupt context provides a suitable circumstance for cronyism   
Cronyism and rent seeking - Some authors simply consider cronyism “as a 
morally loaded synonym for rent-seeking (e.g. Krueger, 2002)” (Aligica & Tarko, 2014, 
p. 158). However, these two concepts are quite different, yet related. “Rent” is defined as 
“that part of the payment to an owner of resources over and above that which those 
resources could command in any alternative use” (Buchanan, 1980, p. 3). It is clear that 
an act of favoritism produces rents for some parties who can then seek those rents for 
gaining economic values over what they normally can get absent such favors. Therefore, 
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cronyism is a practice through which some types of rents are produced and certain types 
of rent seeking behaviors are promoted. In other words, cronyism can be considered as 
one type of exchange relationships in which rent seeking occurs. However, rent seeking 
behaviors take many different forms and occur in several other types of exchange 
relationships that are not involved with exchange of favors between two parties. Also, as 
discussed, cronyism may have a more general meaning and refer to an economic system 
(crony capitalism) that mainly associates with rent seeking behaviors, but its meaning is 
not constrained to just rent seeking.  
Cronyism and corruption - Corruption is defined as an exchange relationship 
that involves abuse of public power for private ends, such that it influence the allocation 
of resources in a context (Macrae, 1982). Hence, cronyism, especially in the form of 
public favoritism, can be considered as one type of corruption in many context (e.g. Li, 
2009). However, generally speaking this is not always the case as the boundaries between 
corruption and cronyism are dependent on cultural norms (Wei, 2001). A government 
official’s act of favoritism toward a family member is considered as a corrupt behavior in 
the western cultures; however it is expected/suggested as an ethical obligation in some 
eastern cultures.  
Moreover, unlike cronyism, corruption is illegal almost everywhere. Cronyism is 
very tricky as it is difficult, if not impossible, to accuse someone of being involved in 
cronyism. Parties involved in cronyism try to hide it or justify their exchange of favor by 
many other reasons, such as public interest or consumer protection rationales (Smith & 
Sutter, 2012). That is why there are no court or indictment records on cronyism and it is 
considered to be a legal practice.     
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Finally, crony capitalism is a system that is associated with different types of 
corruption (Haber, 2002). Tonoyan et al. (2010) suggest that countries in which economic 
players exploit their close networks, such as kinship or friendship networks, in business 
to compensate for lack of formal institutions are very prone to different types of 
corruption, since they offer environments that attribute social values and honors to 
involvement in corrupt behaviors. In other words, cronyism promotes other types of 
corruptions in a society. For instance, un-connected individuals strive to compensate for 
their lack of connection by offering bribes to government officials and receive 
preferential treatments that their connected competitors benefit from because of their 
connections. Moreover, widespread corruption in a business context promotes people’s 
propensity to engage in cronyism (Smith & Sutter, 2012). Consequently, cronyism 
promotes different types of corrupt behaviors and a corrupt context provides a suitable 
circumstance for cronyism. That is why crony capitalism is known for prevalence of 
both, cronyism and corruption, and the vicious reinforcing cycle between them.  
Different forms of cronyism 
Cronyism occurs in different forms. In the developed economies’ context, 
cronyism mostly happens in the form of larger firms lobbying with the government for 
setting certain laws or regulations that benefit them. In contrast, in the developing 
economies’ context, cronyism takes the form of business owners getting governmental 
contracts or acting beyond the law based on their personal relationships with politicians. 
In other words, in developed countries with rule of law, such as US, cronyism is a way to 
build entry barriers for not-favored businesses and reduce competition for favored ones, 
while in less developed countries with low levels of institutional developments such as 
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South American states, cronyism is a mechanism to secure private property rights 
through making implicit partnerships between the owners of property rights (favored 
business) and those who have the power to confiscate them (bureaucrats) (Aligica & 
Tarko, 2014).   
In general, cronyism is complementary to formal economy in developed 
countries, meaning that favored firms get advantageous to participate in the formal 
economy (Aligica & Tarko, 2014). For instance, cronyism occurs in the form of 
lobbying, revolving doors between government official and industries they regulate, 
donations to political campaigns and favored charities, occupational licensing, and so 
forth (Smith & Sutter, 2012). However, in developing countries, cronyism is a 
complement to the informal economy, meaning that favored firms get advantageous to 
remain in the shadow economy and act beyond the law (Aligica & Tarko, 2014). For 
example, businessmen draw on their relationships, governed by reciprocity norm “You 
help me, I help you” (Ledeneva, 1998, p. 185), to find shortcuts in formal procedures. 
Arranging privileged conditions for getting loans, postponing tax payments, jumping off 
the queues for acquiring required licenses, speeding up bank operations, and settling 
business disputes at court are few examples of different forms of cronyism in developing 
countries (Tonoyan et al., 2010).  
In conclusion, any type of privileges granted by government to businesses can be 
delivered through public cronyism (government-business). Examples include preferential 
subsidies, monopoly or quasi-monopoly grants, protection from international competition 
by means of tariffs and licenses, regulatory privilege, loan guarantees, tax privileges, 
bailouts, expected bailouts, and noncompetitive bidding (Mitchell, 2012). Examples of 
27  
private cronyism include "the old boys club" or "the golden circle", hiring friends and 
families, promoting incompetent connected personnel, preferential payments and 
treatments to close colleagues, or any other types of favoritism that occur between two 
private parties in the business context (Turhan, 2013).     
Cronyism: Antecedents 
Scholarly investigation of the antecedents of cronyism has attracted very little 
attention in the literature (Khatri et al., 2006). However, there are several factors at 
different levels of analysis that influence occurrence of cronyism in a context. For 
instance, at the micro-level, individuals’ values and ethical standards influence their 
propensity for engagement in cronyism. At the meso-level, networks’ characteristics and 
norms affect their members’ tendency to get involved in cronyism. At the macro-level, 
government, history, and institutional frameworks can influence individuals’ involvement 
in cronyism within a society. Here, a brief review of micro-, meso-, and macro-level 
antecedents of cronyism is offered.  
Micro-level antecedents of cronyism       
Individuals’ basic desire to be members of different social groups and need to 
enhance their sense of belonging encourage them to get involved in cronyism (Khatri et 
al, 2006). A bureaucrat who favors a friend’s firm over other firms, not only believes that 
his/her friend will reciprocate appropriately in a later time, but also gains positive affect 
from offering that favor to his/her friend and strengthening their friendship. However, 
this is not always the case, as people’s cognitive beliefs and ethical values determine how 
they feel about engagement in cronyism. For instance, for someone who believes “the 
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end justifies the means” (Machiavellianists), cronyism would be a perfect practical option 
(Tonoyan et al., 2010), while for someone who believes in fair business practices, 
engagement in cronyism would be a red line.   
Meso-level antecedents of cronyism 
As mentioned earlier, cronyism is also described as “downside of social 
networking” (Khatri et al., 2003). Network characteristics, such as the basis (family, 
friendship, nationality, etc.) and strength of ties, influence the level of cronyism among 
network members. For instance, Begley et al. (2010) discussed how intra- and inter- 
network competitions in clique networks, group of strong ties, and entrepreneurial 
networks, group of weak ties, positively influence the level of cronyism within these 
networks. Moreover, they posit that network type, clique vs. entrepreneurial, moderate 
the positive effects of network competitions on the level of cronyism, such that, inter-
network competition promotes cronyism more in cliques rather than entrepreneurial 
networks and intra-network competition leads to more cronyism within entrepreneurial 
networks compared to clique networks. Additionally, networks that are formed based on 
cultural bonding characteristics, such as guanxi in China (Khatri et al., 2006), blat in 
Russia (Ledeneva, 1998), and Wasta in Arab countries (Barnett, Yandle, & Naufal, 
2013), instigate the occurrence of cronyism among their members.            
Macro-level antecedents of cronyism 
Prior research on cronyism has mostly focused on country-level analysis (e.g. 
Haber, 2002; Kang, 2002; Johnson & Mitton, 2003). Hence, macro-level antecedents of 
cronyism have attracted the most attention among scholars. Among all the other factors, 
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government is the main focus of scholars as they believe cronyism, especially in its 
public form, is an inevitable by-product of a big government (Holcombe, 2013). A big 
government offers a wide range of privileges and interruptive policies that provide a 
fertile context for cronyism (Mitchell, 2013). In addition to government, culture is 
another major antecedent of cronyism at the macro-level (Khatri et al., 2006). In general, 
certain cultural norms, such as norms of reciprocity and loyalty (Banfied, 1958), and 
cultural characteristics, such as collectivism and power distance (Turhan, 2013), promote 
people’s tendency to engage in cronyism within a society.   
Moreover, scholars extensively highlighted the path-dependent nature of 
societies’ institutions and economic systems (Zingales, 2009). Prevalence of relationship-
based economic activities as opposed to rule-based ones, for example in Asia or Latin 
America, is rooted in the country’s history (Zhou, 2013). In other words, countries’ 
institutional configurations can be seen as a result of their history (Loveridge, 2006). For 
instance, Barnett et al. (2013) posit that “Wasta can be traced to as far back as the 14th 
century. Ibn Khaldun points to the importance of a connection with the ruler in 
determining one’s profit (Spengler, 1964)” (p. 42). Similarly, Morck & Yeung (2004) 
describe family governance and control over a country’s corporate assets, which promote 
cronyism in a country, as a residue of history. Zingales (2009) also attributes the 
differences between American capitalism and other types of capitalism that are more 
cronystic, to several historical factors specific to theUS. For example, Zingales (2009) 
highlights that American capitalism developed at a time when the government spending 
in the economy was very low, less than 7 %, compared to other modern capitalist 
countries that emerged after World War II when government spending was about 30% in 
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Western European countries. He also posits that “in America, unlike much of the rest of 
the West, democracy predates industrialization …this created a public with high 
expectations, unlikely to tolerate evident unfairness in economic policy. It is no 
coincidence that the very concept of anti-trust law — a pro-market but sometimes anti-
business idea — was developed in the United States.” (Zingales, 2009, p. 25). Therefore, 
factors that cause people in specific regions of the World to be more or less prone to 
engage in cronyism, may originate from the history of those regions and the people who 
have been living there in prior centuries.  
Institutional theory offers an appropriate perspective to discuss antecedents of 
cronyism in different countries (North, 1990; Scott, 1995). An institutional perspective is 
able to capture the effects of current and historical factors that influence individuals’ 
tendency to get involved in cronyism within a country’s context. Institutions are rules of 
the game in each society that determine the incentives for engagement in different kinds 
of activities (Hira and Hira, 2000). Institutions are either formal (written rules, 
regulations, laws, etc.) or informal (social norms, beliefs, values, etc.) (North, 1990). 
Baumol (1990, 1993) suggests that the rules of the game at each society determines 
people’s pay off for engagement in productive, unproductive, or destructive 
entrepreneurial behaviors. Improper institutional frameworks degrade incentives to 
engage in productive economic activities and instead encourage people to engage in rent 
seeking behaviors, such as cronyism. Robinson & Acemoglu (2012) refer to such 
institutions as extractive institutions, as opposed to inclusive institutions, which 
encourage people to extract benefits from the others rather than to get involved in 
productive entrepreneurial activities that produce wealth for themselves and society.  
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In following sections, certain characteristics of a country’s institutional 
framework that influence the level of cronyism at national level are highlighted. Since the 
main focus of this dissertation is an investigation of cronyism’s implications for 
entrepreneurship at national level, I chose to focus on cronyism’s consequences. 
However, empirical analysis of cronyism’s antecedents is also an insightful research 
stream that needs further attention. The framework that is explained here, is an 
appropriate model for studying the antecedents of cronyism in future studies.   
Formal Institutions - A significant body of research has formed around the 
notion that institutional environments may have different types of imperfections that can 
persist for several reasons, which discourage socially acceptable behaviors and creating 
unique challenges for firms and the society (e.g. Khanna & Palepu, 1997). Institutional 
imperfections refer to the aspects of societies’ institutional environments that hinder or 
fail to support efficient and fair business practices, and ultimately the attainment of 
societal needs and goals, even when the intent exists for the institutions to do so. Once 
the institutional arrangements are such that cronyism (seeking and offering favors) pays 
off more than productive economic efforts, it is more likely that people invest in 
cronyism instead of productive economic activities (Aligica & Tarko, 2014). Here, a few 
types of institutional imperfections, namely, institutional voids, institutional weakness, 
institutional inefficiency, and institutional uncertainty, are suggested as antecedents of 
cronyism.              
Institutional void means absence, paucity or insufficient development of formal 
institutions, especially market supporting institutions and intermediaries that help to build 
a fair competitive business context (Khanna & Palepu, 1997). There are several examples 
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of Institutional voids that promote cronyism in a society. Capitalism calls for the 
existence of several types of formal institutions, such as independent judiciary, 
autonomous specialists, market supporting intermediaries, national agencies, a 
professional public service, a free media, and an active civil society, that are required as a 
check and balance systems to resolve government’s credible commitment problem – 
making sure that government will not usurp private property rights while it has the right 
to distribute and protect private property rights (Haber, 2002). Absence or insufficient 
development of each of these institutions can trigger the rise of crony capitalism. For 
instance, in developing countries’ business context, lack of sophisticated financial 
assessment institutions leads to a system in which bank officials offer loans to businesses 
based on subjective measures or relationships, which nurture a suitable context for 
cronyism. Consequently, the higher levels of cronyism in developing countries in contrast 
with developed countries can be attributed to higher levels of Institutional voids in these 
contexts.  
Institutional weakness refers to the limited authority, whether in terms of scope, 
power, regulatory capacity, and/or dominance, of institutions to enforce codified rules. 
Institutional weakness simply means the poor status of “rule of the law” in a country. 
Once property rights are weakly protected and there are weak institutional limits and 
safeguards to what government can do in a country, cronyism appears as a solution for 
businessmen to make partnership with the government and build an overlap between their 
self-interest and government’s interests to protect themselves against weak property 
rights, insufficient contract laws, and arbitrary enforcement of business regulations 
(Tonoyan et al., 2010). Bureaucrats also get involved in cronyism to gain business elite’s 
33  
support and secure their power position. As rule of law and protection of property rights 
get stronger in a region, the influence of political connections on business performance 
decreases (Zhou, 2013). Furthermore, institutional weakness let political interest groups 
grow, solidify, and establish their power relationships in a society and secure favors for 
themselves through their connections (Olson, 1982). 
Institutional inefficiency refers to misallocation of resources and distortions of 
incentives by burdensome institutions that undermine efficient market transactions 
overall. A few examples of such Institutional inefficiencies include overwhelming 
taxation, burdensome regulatory frameworks for starting and managing a business, 
extensive license requirements and so on. Once government imposes unjustified costs 
through taxation and regulations to businesses, they have no other choice but to actively 
engage in political processes and participate in crony capitalism for their survival 
(McChesney, 1987). Moreover, inefficient policies produce rents and promote cronyistic 
efforts for capturing those rents. Regulatory capture theory (Stigler, 1971) explains how 
regulations end up benefiting regulated economic actors in the long run instead of serving 
the public interest. Once certain regulations are set, economic players adjust their 
behaviors in the short run, but in long run start developing relationships with regulatory 
agencies to influence them and ultimately capture value from those relationships at the 
cost of public, which means burdensome regulations lead to more opportunities for 
cronyism.  
Institutional uncertainty refers to conditions in which too much discretion is left 
to individuals and organizations as to how to set legitimate goals and operate in socially 
acceptable ways, either due to conflicting institutions, ambiguous policies, complex rules, 
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or overlapping procedures. Political discretion is one example of institutional uncertainty 
which grants politicians the right to use their own subjective criteria to make decisions 
about favoring some over the others in uncertain situations (Holcombe, 2013). Cronyism 
rises once government officials have too much discretion over how to use their power in 
decisions related to the private sector (Henderson, 2012). Institutional uncertainty also 
allows businessmen to be able to collude with bureaucrats more easily and circumvent 
rules and regulations at their own benefit and at the public’s expense (Douhan, & 
Henrekson, 2008).  
Informal Institutions - National culture is one of the main categories of informal 
institutions within every country that influence individuals’ tendency for involvement in 
cronyism. Culture reflects social values, beliefs, and preferences within a national context 
(Hofstede, 1991). Therefore, it can shape individuals cognitive beliefs and values for or 
against the involvement in cronyism. Cultural norms guide how and when individuals are 
expected to favor others or reciprocate their previous favoritism. Prior research suggests 
that cronyism is more likely to happen in a vertical rather than horizontal culture (Khatri 
et al, 2006). In a vertical culture with higher power distance among members of society, 
people accept authorities’ power more readily and compete for gaining their favors as a 
secure way to gain advantage over others. Also, those in power feel a critical need to 
secure their power position through favoring connected individuals in exchange for their 
loyalty. However, in horizontal cultures it is more likely that the parties, whose interests 
are hurt by acts of favoritism, speak up and receive support from others; as such acts 
violate the principle of equality in these cultures. 
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Individualism and collectivism are cultural characteristics that are extensively 
used to describe national cultures. Prior research suggests that individualistic values work 
against promotion of cronyism in a country (Khatri et al., 2006). In an individualistic 
culture, people act as autonomous entities independent of others and have their own 
personal goals which may or may not overlap with other people’s goals. Individualistic 
people emphasize task achievements even at the expense of relationships and therefore 
are less probable to get involved in cronyism which requires them to favor others with 
anticipation for future reciprocation. Hence, it is reasonable to believe that cronyism is 
relatively less prevalent in countries with individualistic cultures. 
In contrast, collectivism dimension of national culture can be described in two 
different dimensions (House et al., 2004; Taylor & Wilson’s, 2012). An in-group 
collectivism dimension, called familism or localism, which reflects the level of “pride in, 
and loyalty to, small groups such as family, organization, circle of close friends, etc.” 
(Taylor & Wilson, 2012, p. 238) and an institutional collectivism, called patriotism or 
nationalism, which reflects “the degree to which organizational and societal institutional 
practices encourage and reward collective distribution of resources and collective action” 
(House et al., 2004, p. 12). Capitalism’s institutions promote beliefs about a shared 
economic nationalism in which “the economic fate of the individual is seen as related in 
an abstract fashion to that of the nation-state” (Loveridge, 2006, p. 119). Nationalism as 
the main legitimizing tool in a capitalist system rejects the idea of localism and degrades 
the value of cronyism, which is basically favoring the interests of specific local groups, 
such as family or friends, over national interest (Aligica & Tarko, 2014). Describing 
Wasta in Arabic societies as “an implicit social contract, typically within a tribal group, 
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which obliges those within the group to provide assistance (favorable treatment) to others 
within the group” (p. 41), Barnett et al. (2013) posit that “where tribal ties dominate 
national interests, a social convention (like wasta) that favors the interests of tribal 
members above national interests is likely to be viewed as both logical and virtuous” (p. 
44). Similarly, prior research found higher levels of corruption and nepotism in countries 
with higher familistic cultures (Lipset & Lenz, 1999).Therefore, the strength of 
nationalism is an underlying informal institution in a society that influences individual’s 
level of national identity positively and his/her general tendency to get involved in 
cronyism negatively. In contrast, it seems reasonable to believe that individuals in 
familistic cultures would be more inclined to favor their local network’s in-group 
member over other members of society. 
Cronyism: Consequences 
Unlike antecedents of cronyism, its consequences have been a main focus of prior 
research. Indeed, cronyism is well known as a major cause of the economic crisis and fall 
of East Asian economies in mid 1990s even after enjoying high rates of economic growth 
for some decades (e.g. Rasiah, 1998; Wade, 1998; Henderson, 1999; Enderwick, 2005). 
Scholars have examined effects of cronyism across many countries and industries. 
Consequently, there is a wide range of cronyism’s effects that are discussed in the 
literature.  
For example, Enderwick (2005) discusses four main categories of cronyism’s 
costs, including, allocative inefficiencies (dominance of family business structure with 
poor governance, firm’s excessive diversification and short term bias due to fear of 
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political changes), dynamic inefficiencies (low rates of innovation and technical change, 
impediments to corporate restructuring), corruption and high transaction costs (specially 
as it discourages foreign investments and hurts small firms), and problems of social and 
political stability (mutual hostage situation between politicians and business leaders) 
(Enderwick, 2005). Similarly, Mitchel (2012) describes nine types of costs associated 
with government privileges that are often granted through cronyism, including, monopoly 
costs, productive inefficiencies (X-inefficiencies), inattention to consumer desires, rent-
seeking, distributional effects, unproductive entrepreneurship, loss of innovation and 
diminished long-run economic growth, macroeconomic instability, and diminished 
legitimacy of government and business (Mitchel, 2012). In the following sections, the 
major consequences of cronyism are highlighted and grouped in three categories: social, 
political, and economic consequences.   
Social consequences of cronyism 
Cronyism is one major factor that contributes to higher levels of income 
inequality in a society by distributing wealth to elites at the expense of public and 
especially the poor (Walder, 2002). Cronyism enables a few families, special interest 
groups, or government cronies to receive unfair advantages over other economic players 
in a society and get facilitated access to resources and opportunities that allow for the 
accumulation of wealth (Zhou, 2013). In fact, crony capitalism can be identified as the 
concentration of control over a large part of a country’s resources and corporate assets in 
hands of few families and groups (Morck & Yeung, 2004; Singh & Zammit, 2006). 
Moreover, dynamism of cronyism, the exchange of favors between government and 
family business groups, exacerbates inequality in a society and prevents unconnected 
38  
individuals from obtaining wealth and moving up in society (Loveridge, 2006). Low 
levels of social mobility and inequality in a society leads to major social costs including 
the promotion of corruption and higher crime rates. 
Additionally, cronyism promotes lobbying efforts and cartel activities in a society, 
which often lead to the promotion of corruption as well as influence the evolution of 
attitudes and culture within a society (Smith & Sutter, 2012). Once cronyism becomes a 
widespread business practice in a society, it provides rationale for more people to engage 
in cronyism and other corrupt business practices, which undermines ethical standards in 
that society (Tonoyan et al., 2010). In such a society, if an entrepreneur is unable or 
unwilling to seek or offer favors, he is considered as a failure rather than an ethical 
businessman. Tonoyan et al., (2010) suggest that countries in which economic players 
exploit their close networks, such as kinship or friendship networks, in business to 
compensate for lack of formal institutions, meaning that cronyism is a common practice 
there, are very susceptible to different kinds of corruption since in those countries social 
values and honors are attributed to involvement in corrupt behaviors. 
Finally, cronyism leads to deadweight loss in a society, since it produces barriers 
to entry and reduces competition in an industry, which leads to lower level of total sales 
in the industry compared to situations where competition is high. Hence, gains of favored 
firms in an industry are less than the losses of the non-favored ones. In such 
circumstance, consumers and society as a whole becomes worse off (Mitchell, 2013). 
Cronyism affects consumer welfare negatively, since consumers cannot access high 
quality products/services that they would have been able to benefit from in a competitive 
market. They even may end up paying higher prices for lower quality products/services 
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that are offered to them by favored firms (Thierer & Skorup, 2013). Overall, these effects 
end up lowering people’s trust in societal institutions, including the government and 
businesses, which promote narrow self-interest among people and undermine their 
contribution in improvement of their society (Khatri et al., 2006; Mitchell, 2013). 
Political consequences of cronyism 
Pervasiveness of cronyism in a system, builds a political market for connections, 
in which connections to different power positions have different prices that firms are 
willing to pay in hope of the future favors that they can receive through those connections 
(Fisman, 2001). For instance, i Vidal, Draca, & Fons-Rosen (2012) found that lobbyists 
who have connection to a US senator lose 24% of their revenues once that senator leaves 
office. Just being connected to someone in power signals the ability to receive favors and 
gain abnormal advantageous. Acemoglu et al. (2013) found that firms captured a 6% 
abnormal return if they were connected to Timothy Geithner one day after announcement 
of his nomination for Treasury Secretary in November 2008. Obviously, such returns was 
not because of favoritisms that those firms could receive in that one day, but because of 
people’s positive perceptions about future favors that they can receive through their 
connections to Treasury Secretary. Additionally, market value of political connections 
results in a revolving door (movement of government officials into lobbying industry or 
businesses that they used to serve) between government and business (i Vidal et al., 
2012).  
Cronyism promotes political authoritarianism by suppressing political 
competitions and other appropriate institutions that support democratic processes (Morck 
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& Yeung, 2004). Once cronyism is a common practice, businesses often have no choice 
but to engage in cronyism and gain profit through politicians’ favoritism and, in 
exchange, support those politicians to stay in power (Holcombe, 2013). Therefore, 
politicians and favored businesses get locked into a situation of mutual dependency, 
mutual hostage problem, in which, change by one part threatens position of the other part 
(Enderwick, 2005). In such a system, both parts have a short term focus at the expense of 
long-term benefits to society. Consequently, politicians set rules and policies that lead to 
maximum political support for themselves, and businesses strive to benefit from 
politicians’ favoritism as long as they are in office (Becker, 1983).  
Economic consequences of cronyism 
Cronyism is known to have a wide range of economic consequences; however, 
these effects are different based on the level of analysis and time frame. At the 
organizational level, most scholars studied effects of political connections on firm’s 
performance, with underlying assumption that political connections lead to favoritism. In 
general, having political connections benefits a firm’s overall performance, especially 
when the firm is small and at the earlier stages of their development (e.g. Li & Zhang, 
2007; Li et al., 2008; Xin & Pearce, 1996; Zhou, 2013). However, cronyism’s long-term 
effects are uncertain and can be even detrimental to firm performance as it undermines 
firm’s ability to plan for the long-term and diverts its efforts to political rent seeking 
instead of working on its core competencies and building sustainable competitive 
advantages (Enderwick, 2005; Tahoun, 2014). The same patterns are true at the societal 
level. Cronyism’s effects are known to be different for countries at different stages of 
development, such that, cronyism may have some short-term benefits for countries at 
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earlier stages of development, but the costs become progressively higher in the long-run 
as countries become more developed (Shleifer & Vishny, 1994). 
Organizational-level economic consequences - At the organizational level, 
cronyism provides strong protection of property rights and facilitated access to resources 
and opportunities for politically connected firms, especially in under-developed regions, 
in which lack of formal institutions are substituted by cronyism (Zhou, 2013). There are 
numerous empirical findings from developed and developing countries that suggest firms 
with political connections enjoy higher financial performance in market as they either 
receive or at least are perceived to receive favors through their connections (e.g. 
Acemoglu et al., 2013; Faccio, 2006; Faccio, Masulis, & McConnell, 2006; Fisman, 
2001; Chen, Parsley, & Yang, 2013; Borisov, Goldman, & Gupta, 2013; Hill, Kelly, 
Lockhart, & Van Ness, 2013). For instance, Cooper and his colleagues (2010) report 
positive future stock-market returns for companies that had higher contributions to US 
political campaigns from 1979 to 2004. Similarly, Claessens, Feijen, & Laeven (2008) 
found that politically connected firms with higher campaign contributions in Brazil enjoy 
higher stock performance and easier access to bank finance.  
In contrast, there are studies that either fail to find any significant effects between 
firm’s political connections and its performance (e.g. Fisman et al., 2012) or suggest that 
politically connected firms underperform compared to unconnected firms (Faccio, 2010; 
Duchin & Sosyura, 2012). For instance, Tahoun (2014) documents that politically 
connected firms enjoy easy access to government contracts, however, once they lose their 
connections, firm performance suffers drastically and they underperform other firms. 
Similarly, Faccio (2010) shows that favored firms’ accounting performance are lower 
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compared to others. Also, Duchin & Sosyura (2012) report that investments in connected 
firms underperform investments in other firms, meaning that connected firms suffer from 
investment inefficiencies. Sobel & Graefe-Anderson (2014) show that favors toward 
connected firms end up benefiting the firms’ managers rather than the firms’ 
performance. 
In conclusion, I submit that cronyism influences firms’ performance more 
favorably when firms are smaller and at the early stages of their development, especially 
in regions with less developed institutions (Peng & Luo, 2000; Zhou, 2013). In such a 
context, cronyism helps new ventures to overcome the liability of newness and survive in 
competition with larger firms. However, as firms grow, they are required to focus on 
developing their core competencies to gain sustainable competitive advantageous in the 
long term. Dependence on cronyism distracts firm’s investments in building its own 
capabilities, wastes its resources in political games, and makes it short-sighted 
(Enderwick, 2006). Consequently, although cronyism may provide firms with short-term 
financial incentives, it endangers their long-term profitability and survival. Moreover, 
costs associated with engagement in cronyism surpass its benefits for firms as 
institutional frameworks develop in a context, since more developed institutions have 
more checks and balances against involvement of agents (bureaucrats and businessmen) 
in cronyism (Shleifer & Vishny, 1994; Zhou, 2013). Therefore, firms in less developed 
countries benefit more from engagement in cronyism compared to their counterparts in 
developed countries. The next chapter explains how cronyism leads to firm’s ignorance 
to develop its dynamic and innovative capabilities, which is a major long-term 
disadvantage of depending on cronyism (Baumol, 1990).        
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National-level economic consequences - Similar to organizational level 
consequences, cronyism has different effects in countries that are in different stages of 
economic development. In developed economies, cronyism slows down economic growth 
by restricting economic freedom, producing barriers to entry, increasing lobbying efforts, 
and disrupting market competitions (Smith, & Sutter, 2012). However, in developing 
countries, cronyism is often considered as the second best solution to government’s 
credible commitment problem and makes economic growth possible in the absence of 
political stability and the rule of law (Aligica & Tarko, 2014).  
Crony capitalism rises in response to government’s credible commitment issue 
(Haber, 2002). Businesses need to make sure that government is not able to usurp their 
property right, while it has the right and power to distribute and protect property rights in 
society (Enderwick, 2005). Capitalism’s solution to this issue is a “limited government” 
accompanied with several other institutions, such as independent judiciary, central and 
local governments, autonomous specialists, national agencies, a professional public 
service, a free media, and an active civil society, to check and balance the system. 
However, it is costly, complex, and a long process to develop such institutions in a 
society, and few countries in the world have managed to develop institutional 
frameworks close to capitalism’s ideal model. Consequently, crony capitalism rises as a 
practical alternative to make ‘doing business’ possible in absence of developed formal 
institutions (Aligica & Tarko, 2014). Cronyism is the second best solution that fulfills 
both businesses’ and government’s interests through building partnerships between them. 
Therefore, in the short term, cronyism helps with the process of doing business 
and economic growth; however, in the long term, as countries transition to higher stages 
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of economic development and fail to develop their institutions, cronyism’s costs 
dominate its benefits and it becomes detrimental to both doing business and economic 
growth (Morck, Wolfenzon, & Yeung, 2005; Singh & Zammit, 2006; Zhou, 2013). Once 
cronyism has persisted as a major practice in a country for a long period of time, its 
consequences cause the economic system subject to different types of inefficiencies and 
failures that endanger well-being of the system (Loveridge, 2006; Li, 2009). For instance, 
Wei (2001) posits that cronyism is a signal of the potential for a financial crisis as it 
causes a country to be more dependent on volatile international capital flows (e.g. 
international bank loans) and undermines its ability to attract less volatile capital flows 
(e.g. foreign direct investment). Ideally, countries need to avoid the destructive effects of 
widespread cronyism in their economic development path and build their institutions 
such that businesses transition from network-based strategies to market based strategies 
as countries’ economic systems evolve (Loveridge, 2006; Li, 2009; Barnett et al., 2013). 
Prevalence and persistence of cronyism as a major business practice leads to 
different types of inefficiencies, allocative and dynamic or X-inefficiencies (Leibenstein, 
1966; Enderwick, 2005). Favoritism toward government cronies leads to the 
misallocation of resources and concentrates corporate assets into the hands of a few 
connected families and groups in a country (Morck & Yeung, 2004). Cronyism results in 
the persistence and dominance of poor forms of corporate governance, such as family 
business governance, that are mostly inefficient in adopting new methods of organization 
and production (Loveridge, 2006; Barnett et al., 2013). Different forms of cronyism 
produce barriers to entry for new firms, which shield inefficient protected industries that 
have no comparative advantage (Enderwick, 2005). Moreover, cronyism reduces market-
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based competitions among firms. Lack of competitive forces in the market place allows 
businesses not to do their best and not to push themselves to develop efficient business 
practices/ routines as hard as they would push in a competitive context. This is generally 
called X-inefficiency (Leibenstein, 1966), which is one major cost of cronyism in a 
business context (Mitchell, 2013).         
Finally, the most destructive effect of cronyism is its tendency to discourage 
corporate restructuring and innovative economic behaviors (Enderwick, 2005). Cronyism 
produces economic rents, promotes rent seeking behaviors, and discourages wealth 
creation through productive entrepreneurship (Baumol, 1990). Morck & Yeung (2004) 
found that family control over a country’s resources is associated with less innovation 
and more political rent seeking, which is the “self-interested dealings between the 
political and business elites” (p. 391) (see also, Morck, Stangeland, & Yeung, 1998). 
Similarly, Lenway, Morck, & Yeung (1996) used data from US steel firms to show that 
trade protections, so often granted through cronyism, decrease the incentives to innovate 
and discourage engagement in the Schumpeterian process of creative destruction for 
firms. I argue that cronyism almost always has negative influences on innovation and 
productive entrepreneurship and this is why as countries transition through different 
stages of economic development, namely, factor-driven stage, efficiency-driven stage, 
and innovation-driven stage, cronyism’s costs become more pronounced compared to its 
benefits. Cronyism’s negative effects on innovation and productive entrepreneurship at 
the national level are the main focus of this research. I use Baumol’s (1990) model of 
productive, unproductive/destructive entrepreneurship to discuss about these effects in 
next chapter.  
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One last important point about the consequences of cronyism in a country is that 
cronyism causes more cronyism (Holcombe, 2013). Once people see a practice, such as 
cronyism, becomes widespread in a context, they invest in adopting that practice more 
easily and at a faster rate, even if it’s illegal or prohibited (Tonoyan, et al., 2010). 
Moreover, cronyism’s consequences and antecedents are very much inter-dependent, 
meaning that its consequences can instigate its antecedents. That’s why crony capitalism 
is known as a complex combination of cronyism’s consequences and antecedents. 
Countries that fall into the “idea trap” of crony capitalism will have their private and 
public resources becomes locked into promotion of such system, and will fall into a 
reinforcing vicious cycle that is able to destroy or obliterate the whole economy of a 
country in the long run.  
Figure 1 is an illustration of the antecedents and consequences of cronyism in 
prior research, which is briefly discussed in this chapter.  
Productive and Unproductive Entrepreneurship 
Ever since Schumpeter proposed his creative destruction hypothesis in the 1930s 
and defined entrepreneurship as activities that involve different types of innovations (new 
product, new process, new supply, new market, and new organizing method), 
entrepreneurship has been at the center of scholars’ attention because of its positive 
effects on economic development and growth (Reynolds et al., 1999; Zacharakis et al, 
2000). However, recently scholars have pointed out that entrepreneurship does not 
necessarily include innovations in productive ways as Schumpeter originally suggested, 






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































“innovations in rent-seeking procedures, for example, discovery of a previously unused 
legal gambit that is effective in diverting rents to those who are able and willing to 
exploit them.” (Baumol, 1990, p. 897). Therefore, it is important to make a distinction 
between productive and unproductive entrepreneurship when antecedents and 
consequences of entrepreneurship are investigated.  
Productive Entrepreneurship (PE) refers to activities that increase the 
innovativeness, adaptability, and dynamicity of an economy, and create wealth for 
entrepreneurs and their society (Baumol, 1990; 1996; Sobel, 2008; Douhan & Henrekson, 
2008). Examples include product/service innovations, business model innovations, 
commercialization of new technologies, and establishment of new firms. These activities 
are also called productive market entrepreneurship as they are considered to be legal, 
legitimate, and typical activities within market (Folsom, 1991; Sobel, 2008). 
In contrast, Unproductive Entrepreneurship (UE) refers to unproductive 
innovative activities that mostly destroy wealth in an economy and results in positive 
returns for certain individuals at expense of other individuals and society (Baumol, 1990; 
1996). Examples include innovation in rent seeking activities such as lawsuit abuse 
(finding new ways to sue people) by lawyers, discovering new ways of securing money 
for elections by lobbyists, Gerrymandering (manipulating district boundaries to create 
partisan advantaged districts), Swindling, and etc. (North, 1990; Baumol, 1990; 1996; 
Douhan & Henrekson, 2008). These activities are also called unproductive political 
entrepreneurship as they often happen through manipulation of political and legal 
processes and aim to circumvent institutional frameworks, without necessarily an explicit 
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violation, to transfer wealth to those who are involved in such activities (Folsom, 1991; 
Sobel, 2008; Douhan & Henrekson, 2008).  
In economic term, productive entrepreneurship shifts the production possibility 
frontiers (PPF) outward, while unproductive entrepreneurship shifts PPF inward in a 
society (Coyne & Leeson, 2004). PPF represents the maximum possible economic output 
of a society, given all the available inputs (resources, labors, raw materials, etc.). 
Productive entrepreneurs introduce innovative recombination of resources; hence they 
make it possible to reach higher levels of output using the available inputs. However, 
unproductive entrepreneurs redistribute resources in innovative inefficient ways to their 
own benefits, such that their acts decrease the maximum possible output for a society 
given their available inputs (Coyne et al., 2010).       
Baumol’s model  
Baumol’s model explains how individuals choose to engage in productive or 
unproductive entrepreneurship within a certain context (Baumol, 1990; 1993; 1996). 
Baumol’s main thesis is that people choose between involvement in productive and 
unproductive entrepreneurship by considering the relative return that each one provides 
for them. Relative return of productive and unproductive entrepreneurship is determined 
by the rules of the game, institutions, in each context and signals potential entrepreneurs 
how attractive is to pursue each path. In other words, Baumol describes a utility 
maximization model that potential entrepreneurs use to choose between involvements in 
productive vs. unproductive entrepreneurship (Sobel, 2008).  
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In his seminal paper, Baumol (1990) discusses several instances throughout the 
history of mankind in different societies in which relative rewards to different types of 
entrepreneurial activities determined the pattern of entrepreneurial efforts in that context. 
For example, he explains how the rules of the game degraded the pursuit of wealth 
through productive business activities in ancient World. Additionally, he explains about a 
story of a man in ancient Rome that lost his head because of inventing unbreakable glass 
and turning it over to the emperor in hopes of reward. Overall, Baumol concludes that “it 
is the set of rules and not the supply of entrepreneurs or the nature of their objectives that 
undergoes significant changes from one period to another and helps to dictate the 
ultimate effect on the economy via the allocation of entrepreneurial resources.” (Baumol, 
1990, p. 894).  
Murphy et al. (1991) echoed Bumol’s model by demonstrating how relative return 
of involvement in productive vs. unproductive efforts influences allocation of a country’s 
most talented individuals among different activities. They posit that talented individuals 
aspire to capture the rents derived from their talents in most promising ways and enter 
occupations that reward them with reasonable return for their talents. They present 
empirical evidence that shows “occupational choice depends on returns to ability and to 
scale in each sector, on market size, and on compensation contracts.” (Murphy et al., 
1991, p. 503). In countries that rent seeking rewards talent more than entrepreneurship 
does, talented individuals choose to study law degrees more often than they choose to 
study engineering (Magee, Brock, & Young, 1989; Murphy et. al, 1991).      
Since the presentation of Baumol’s idea in 1990, there have been several studies 
that further developed and discussed Baumol’s model of productive, unproductive, and 
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destructive entrepreneurship (e.g. Baumol 1990; 1993; 2002; Boettke, 2001; Boettke & 
Coyne, 2003; Coyne & Leeson, 2004; Kreft & Sobel, 2005; Ovaska & Sobel, 2005). As a 
prominent example, Sobel (2008) tests Baumol’s model and provides strong empirical 
support for this model in the US. Sobel (2008) examines the relationship between the 
measures of quality of institutions in different states and the level of productive and 
unproductive entrepreneurship in those states. He finds that better institutional 
frameworks (more secure property right regime, more balanced and fair judicial system, 
stronger contract enforcement, etc.) promote productive entrepreneurship (higher venture 
capital investments, higher rate of patents, faster rate of sole proprietorship growth, and 
higher establishment birth rates) and reduce unproductive entrepreneurship (lobbying 
activity and legal quality/lawsuit).     
In sum, Baumol’s model explains that the rules of the game determine rewards to 
productive vs. unproductive entrepreneurship in any context and the relative return to 
those activities influence allocation of resources to productive vs. unproductive 
entrepreneurship in that context. Murphy et al., (1991) clarifies Baumol’s model by 
explaining how such relative returns influence allocation of talents within a country 
between productive and unproductive occupations. They also demonstrate how allocation 
of countries’ talents between productive vs. unproductive entrepreneurship is related to 
their economic growth rate. Those countries in which the rules of the game encourage 
individuals to adopt unproductive occupations over productive ones, suffer from slower 
rates of economic growth (Magee et al., 1989; Murphy et. al, 1991). Therefore, it is 
crucial to understand how the rules of the game determine payoff for productive and 
unproductive entrepreneurship in a certain context. 
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Institutions as rules of the game    
Bumol’s model is built upon the notion that the rules of the game determine 
relative return to engagement in productive vs. unproductive entrepreneurship in each 
society (Baumol, 1990). As discussed earlier, “institutions are the rules of the game in a 
society or, more formally, are the humanly devised constraints that shape human 
interaction.”(North, 1990, p. 3). These institutions are either formal (written rules, 
regulations, laws, etc.) or informal (social norms, beliefs, values, etc.) (North, 1990). 
Institutions, as the rules of the game, constrain or promote certain types of behaviors and 
interactions among players, entrepreneurs or organizations, in a society (Hira & Hira, 
2000). Therefore, formal and informal institutions are major determinants of 
entrepreneurial activities in a certain context, since they govern the relative, pecuniary 
and non-pecuniary, return of entrepreneurial activities, including both PE and UE 
(Acemoglu, 1995).     
Research on institutions’ effects on entrepreneurial behaviors has attracted 
extensive attention within entrepreneurship and institutional economics discipline (e.g. 
Puffer, et al., 2010; Gohmann, 2012; Boudreaux, 2014). Examples of institutions that 
promote PE and discourage UE include the rule of law, secure property rights, strong 
contract enforcement, free trade, efficient tax codes, fair and transparent business 
practices, and so on. Sobel (2008) posits that institutions that are measured by economic 
freedom index2 (Gwartney & Lawson, 2005) are “precisely those institutional structures 
                                                          
2- Economic freedom index measures institutions’ quality in ten categories, namely, property rights, 
freedom from corruption, fiscal freedom, government spending, business freedom, labor freedom, 
monetary freedom, trade freedom, investment freedom, and financial freedom.  
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that should lower the return to unproductive entrepreneurship, promoting productive 
entrepreneurship over unproductive entrepreneurship” (Sobel, 2008, p. 645). Acemoglu 
& Robinson (2012) refer to such institutions as inclusive institutions, those institutions 
that help produce wealth for individuals and society, as opposed to extractive institutions, 
those that help elites to extract wealth for themselves at the expense of others and society. 
One major type of institution that determines relative payoff for involvement in 
productive vs. unproductive entrepreneurship in a country is entrepreneurship policy 
(Minniti, 2008). There are several studies that have investigated the effects of 
government policy and programs on the level of entrepreneurial behaviors within 
different countries (e.g. Brenner, 1987; Minniti, 2008; Lee, Yamakawa, Peng, & Barney, 
2011; Herrera & Sánchez-González, 2013). However, whether government’s 
entrepreneurship policies and programs increase or decrease the rewards for productive 
entrepreneurship more than the rewards for unproductive entrepreneurship is an 
important research question that is yet to be answered (Capelleras, Mole, Greene, & 
Storey, 2008; Norrman & Bager-Sjögren, 2010). Here, I submit that those policies and 
programs that are very much dependent on subjective judgements of bureaucrats and 
leave room for occurrence of cronyism will end up promoting UE over PE, even though 
this may be contrary to the original purpose of designing those policies and programs 
(Fei, Guliang, & Young, 2012).  
Cronyism and Entrepreneurship 
There are several arguments that suggest cronyism discourages productive 
entrepreneurship in a society (Singh & Zammit, 2006; Loveridge, 2006). This study 
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adopts Baumol’s model and institutional theory to argue how the prevalence of cronyism 
as a routine business practice discourages PE and encourages UE in a country.  
The main thesis here is that once cronyism becomes a routine business practice in 
a context, it functions as an informal institution, either as a cognitive belief (the common 
path to success) or as a normative belief (how things are getting done around here), that 
increases the reward for unproductive entrepreneurship and decreases the return to 
productive entrepreneurship (Baumol, 1990). Hence, cronyism plays the role of an 
informal rule of the game that promotes allocation of country’s talents and other 
resources to UE, at the expense of driving them away from PE. Moreover, cronyism not 
only influences allocation of entrepreneurial talents between productive and unproductive 
efforts, but also decreases the supply of entrepreneurial talents by decreasing individuals’ 
motivations and intentions for entering entrepreneurship field.  
The main argument here may seem contradictory to a strong body of research in 
entrepreneurship discipline that suggest the positive effects of informal networks promote 
entrepreneurial behaviors, especially, in contexts of developing countries that suffer from 
different types of institutional imperfections (e.g. Xin & Pearce, 1996; Puffer et al., 
2010). The main argument there is that informal networks, such as Guanxi in China or 
Blat in Russia, and advantages derived from them for entrepreneurs, including favoritism 
and support, substitute for negative effects of imperfections that exist in formal 
institutional structures in those countries and help entrepreneurs to achieve their goals. 
This dissertation does not reject these findings but aims to study this phenomenon at a 
higher level of analysis. In other words, I acknowledge that having informal networks 
helps an entrepreneur to pursue his goals at individual/organizational level, but I posit 
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that once having informal networks becomes a key success factor, and maybe the only 
success factor, in a country, then the level of productive entrepreneurship efforts is 
influenced negatively at the national level.  
Cronyism promotes unproductive entrepreneurship 
Social, political, and economic consequences of cronyism are reviewed in the 
second chapter of this study. As discussed, several of those consequences can either 
include unproductive efforts (e.g. promotion of corruption and destruction of customer 
welfare) or promote antecedents of unproductive efforts (e.g. degrading ethical standards 
and promoting narrow self-interest). The clearest influence of cronyism on unproductive 
entrepreneurship in societies occurs through promoting economic and political rent 
seeking behaviors. An act of favoritism based on connections (cronyism) produces rents 
for parties involved in cronyism and encourages rent seeking activities to capture those 
rents. These activities can be either economic rent seeking to get access to economic 
resources and opportunities or political rent seeking to achieve political power and 
influence. 
Cronyism encourages economic rent seeking in a society. Firms that engage in 
cronyism are able to secure resources and support from government through their 
connections. For instance, Li (2002) demonstrates that credit assistance programs 
significantly benefit targeted entrepreneurs at the cost of non-targeted entrepreneurs. He 
finds that total productive entrepreneurial activities are reduced because of these 
programs (Li, 2002). Similarly, Zhou (2013) shows that politically connected 
entrepreneurial firms receive entrepreneurial reinvestments easier and more often than 
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other firms. Moreover, prior research have made it clear that politically connected firms 
are more likely to receive favors and be bailed out in case of economic crisis than their 
similar non-connected competitors (e.g. Faccio et al., 2006; Blau, Brough, & Thomas, 
2013).  
Most of government-supported programs and policies, especially in imperfect 
institutional contexts, fail to define clear objective standards for targeting firms. Hence, 
their performance depends on bureaucrats’ subjective evaluations of entrepreneurial 
firms’ performance and other criteria. It is obvious that in such condition, connected 
firms are favored and receive better subjective evaluations, meaning that cronyism plays 
a significant role in deciding who receives the support and preferential treatment (Fei et 
al., 2012). For instance, Chen et al. (2012) posit that in China, entrepreneurs who used to 
be members of legislative bodies or act as government advisers can easily obtain 
preferential treatments and support from the government.        
Therefore, firms that engage in cronyism and capture the economic rents resulted 
from it, have access to resources and opportunities that are not available to those who 
choose not to engage in this kind of rent seeking behaviors. These unfair advantages and 
benefits that result from cronyism reduce the rewards for productive entrepreneurial 
efforts and increase the return for engagement in rent seeking activities that capture the 
economic rents resulted from cronyism. Hence, firms are encouraged to reallocate their 
resources such that they can seek more rents through cronyism (Baumol, 1990). The 
more the firms adopt cronyism as a business practice to secure economic rents in a 
society, the more legitimized and necessary it becomes for other firms to seek economic 
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rents through engagement in cronyism in that society (Tonoyan et al., 2010; Holcombe, 
2013)   
Cronyism also promotes political rent seeking, “self-interested dealings between 
the political and business elites” (Morck & Yeung, 2004, p. 391). As discussed earlier, 
cronyism is an exchange of favors between two parties, which provides the involved 
parties with unfair advantages over a third party or public (Khatri et al., 2006). Hence, 
cronyism promotes narrow self-interest among citizens of a country which drives talents 
away from productive activities toward unproductive or even destructive political rent-
seeking behaviors such as lobbying with politicians, or cultivating favor with bureaucrats 
(Murphy et al., 1991; 1993). In the politicians-entrepreneurs relationships, politicians 
favor entrepreneurs and provide them with economic rents in exchange for the 
entrepreneurs’ political supports and economic contributions to political campaigns. Once 
the exchange of favors (cronyism) becomes a common practice in a country, politicians 
and entrepreneurs are mutually dependent on each other and strive to preserve the status 
quo irrespective of the welfare costs to society (Enderwick, 2005; Douhan & Henrekson, 
2008).  
In a mutual hostage condition between politicians and entrepreneurs, politicians 
have de jure power because of their positions in the political institutions, while 
entrepreneurs have de facto power because of their possession of resources in the country 
(Acemoglu & Robinson, 2006). Therefore, entrepreneurs strive to leverage their de facto 
power through political rent seeking activities such as lobbying efforts to either change 
institutions or change institutions’ functions to their own advantage (Douhan & 
Henrekson, 2008). In other words, cronyism is a major practice through which 
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entrepreneurs get involved in political rent seeking activities and change institutions or 
their functions to benefit them. The more prevalent the cronyism becomes in a country, 
the more necessary it is for entrepreneurs to engage in political rent seeking activities to 
secure economic rents for themselves and prevent potential harm to their business 
because of other entrepreneurs’ lobbying or lawsuit efforts (Holcombe, 2013).     
Finally, as mentioned earlier, cronyism is not considered as a corrupt practice 
everywhere, however, it promotes other types of corrupt behaviors in any society. For 
instance, un-connected entrepreneurs who cannot benefit from cronyism, strive to 
compensate for their lack of connection by offering bribes to bureaucrats in exchange for 
preferential treatments that their connected competitors benefit from because of their 
connections. Moreover, cronyism influences the culture, attitude, and ethical standards of 
a society by promoting lobbying and cartel activities, which make citizens insensitive to 
unfairness, suppress social mobility, and increase inequality (Smith & Sutter, 2012). In 
such a society, if an entrepreneur is unable or unwilling to seek or offer favors, he is 
considered as a failure rather than an ethical businessman. Tonoyan et al., (2010) 
suggests that countries in which economic players exploit their close networks, such as 
kinship or friendship networks, in business to compensate for lack of formal institutions, 
meaning that cronyism is a common practice there, are very susceptible to different kinds 
of corruption because in those countries social values and honors are attributed to 
involvement in corrupt behaviors rather than fair transparent business practices. 
Therefore, prevalence of cronyism leads to occurrence of other types of corrupt and 
unproductive entrepreneurial efforts in a country.   
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Overall, the above discussion indicates that widespread cronyism in a country 
increases the rewards to unproductive entrepreneurial efforts, such as economic rent 
seeking, political rent seeking, and other corrupt behaviors, in that country. Hence, 
cronyism makes it more attractive for individuals in a country to engage in UE. 
Therefore, there is a positive relationship between the level of cronyism in one country 
and the level of unproductive entrepreneurship in that country.  
Hypothesis 1: There is a positive relationship between prevalence of cronyism 
in a country and level of unproductive entrepreneurship in that country.  
Cronyism reduces productive entrepreneurship 
The highest cost of cronyism in a country is its destructive effect on productive 
entrepreneurship, including corporate restructuring and innovative economic behaviors 
(Enderwick, 2005). As discussed earlier, cronyism’s consequences can be different for 
countries at different stages of development, such that, cronyism may have some short-
term benefits for countries at earlier stages of development, but its cost become more 
pronounced in the long-run as countries’ institutions become more developed and it 
becomes more difficult for both entrepreneurs and bureaucrats to seek and offer favors 
(Shleifer & Vishny, 1994). Acemoglu et al. (2012) posit that there are two possible 
growth paths for developing countries that have extractive institutions: 1) to allocate 
resources to high productive activities that are controlled by the elites (e.g. Barbados, 
Soviet Union), meaning, to leverage cronyism in certain industries to instigate growth, 2) 
when elites feel relatively secure in their positions they may wish to let the emergence of 
relatively inclusive institutions under their control (e.g., South Korea under General Park, 
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China today). However, they add, that this growth path is not at all sustainable since it 
does not allow for creative destructions that change the status quo for elites and 
politicians. Therefore, I submit that while cronyism may have some positive growth 
implications in early economic development stages, it almost always has negative effects 
on productive entrepreneurship and innovation in countries. This explains why as 
countries transition through different stages of economic development, namely, factor-
driven stage, efficiency-driven stage, and innovation-driven stage, and their growth 
becomes more dependent on productive entrepreneurship, cronyism’s cost becomes more 
highlighted than its benefits. 
This section elaborates on how cronyism influences both allocation and supply of 
productive entrepreneurship in a destructive way. There are two major arguments here. 
First, cronyism changes pecuniary and non-pecuniary aspects of the reward structure of 
involvement in productive and unproductive entrepreneurial efforts in a society such that 
individuals reallocate their resources away from PE to UE (Baumol, 1990; Murphy et al., 
1991). Second, cronyism decreases the supply of productive entrepreneurship by 
debilitating individuals’ motivations and hopes for entrepreneurial success in a country.      
Cronyism and diversion of resources away from PE - As discussed in previous 
sections, cronyism increases the payoff for unproductive entrepreneurship in a society 
and attracts individuals to political and economic rent seeking. This implies that cronyism 
drives talents and resources away from productive entrepreneurship in a society, since the 
same abilities and talents that can be used in productive ways, are encouraged by 
cronyism to be invested in unproductive practices (Murphy et al., 1991). In fact, the real 
social cost of rent seeking includes opportunity cost of resources that could be 
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implemented to productive entrepreneurship, but are wasted in unproductive 
entrepreneurship (Sobel & Garett, 2002).  
Moreover, cronyism leads to long term deadweight loss for a society through 
promoting rent seeking activities. Acemoglu (1995) posits that:  
“the existence of rent-seeking creates a negative externality on productive 
agents… In a dynamic setting, allocations of past generations as well as 
expectations of future allocations influence current rewards and the society may 
get trapped in a ‘rent-seeking’ steady state equilibrium… more rent-seeking in the 
society reduces the return both to entrepreneurship and rent-seeking… When an 
agent chooses rent-seeking, he influences the relative rewards of the current 
generation but since he will be an active rent-seeker for a number of periods to 
come, he also influences the relative rewards to future generations.” (Acemoglu, 
1995, p. 17, 18).  
Acemoglu (1995) claims that countries get locked into an “underdevelopment 
trap” in which rent seeking behaviors are reinforced at the expense of productive 
entrepreneurship. This is in line with the discussion of cronyism’s vicious reinforcing 
cycle offered earlier in this study. Countries that fall into “idea trap” of cronyism, as a 
pragmatic way of getting business done, eventually find their private and public resources 
locked into such system that a reinforcing vicious cycle of cronyism is able to destroy or 
obliterate the whole economy of a country.   
Prior research includes empirical evidence on the negative association of rent 
seeking and productive entrepreneurship. For instance, Morck & Yeung (2004) found 
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family control over country’s resources, which implies more cronyism, is associated with 
less innovation and more political rent seeking. Similarly, Morck et al. (1998) found that 
countries with more signs of political rent seeking have fewer self-made entrepreneurs 
and spend less on innovation (also have more concentrated capital structure that implies 
more cronyism). Additionally, Murphy et al. (1993) define public rent seeking as “either 
redistribution from the private sector to the state, such as taxation, or alternatively, from 
private sector to government bureaucrats that affect the fortunes of the private sector, 
which takes the forms of lobbying, corruption, and so on.” (Murphy, et al., 1993, p. 412) 
and distinguish it from private rent seeking that takes “the form of theft, piracy, litigation, 
and other forms of transfer between private parties” (Murphy, et al., 1993, p. 412). They 
argue that public rent seeking is particularly harmful to innovation, since innovators are 
more dependent on government supplied goods, such as, permits, licenses, property right 
protections and so on, than established firms (Bardhan, 1997).   
There are two major reasons that make cronyism’s effects on rent seeking 
detrimental to productive entrepreneurship. First, cronyism makes governmental 
programs and policies ineffective or even destructive for reallocating resources toward 
productive entrepreneurship. For instance, it is shown that government’s credit guarantee 
policy is associated with less R&D investments and innovation (Oh, Jeong-Dong, 
Heshmati, & Gyoung-Gyu, 2009). Similarly, Lenway et al. (1996) used data from US 
steel firms to show that trade protections, so often granted through cronyism, decrease 
incentives for innovation and engagement in the Schumpeterian process of creative 
destruction for firms. In fact, more cronyism is associated with more governmental 
supporting programs and bigger government size, which is shown to be inversely related 
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to entrepreneurial entry within different countries (Aidis, Estrin, & Mickiewicz, 2012). 
One major reason for this ineffectiveness is the destructive role that connected firms play 
in policy formulation and execution processes through cronyism and their political rent 
seeking behaviors (Arshed et al., 2014). 
The second reason that makes cronyism’s effect on rent seeking detrimental to 
productive entrepreneurship is that more involvement in unproductive entrepreneurship 
means less investment on productive entrepreneurship capabilities. Once firms get 
involved in cronyism they start to invest more on how to be a better rent seeker instead of 
investing on building their innovative capabilities. In other words, cronyism makes 
entrepreneurs short term oriented and unwilling to plan for investments on building long 
term competitive advantages and involvement in innovative processes that generally have 
uncertain long term rates of return (Enderwick, 2005). As an empirical evidence for this 
claim, Su, Xie, & Wang (2015) demonstrate that more political networking is associated 
with lower levels of entrepreneurial orientation in firms (Lumkin & Dess, 1996).   
Cronyism and reduction of PE supply - In a crony capitalism system, political 
connections are the main success factors and individuals have less incentive to engage in 
productive entrepreneurial behaviors (Cook & Barry, 1993; Smith & Sutter, 2012). For 
instance, in Italy, Zingales (2009) posits that entrepreneurs find innovation in markets as 
not the best way to make money as 80 percent of Italian managers believe that 
“knowledge of influential people” is the most important factor for financial success. 
Obviously, in such an economic system that connections and favors determine the 
winners, individuals are unable to capture rents from their own talents if they want to 
pursue productive entrepreneurship (Murphy et al., 1991). Therefore, they either choose 
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unproductive entrepreneurship or forget about entering entrepreneurship and the self-
employment sector.  
Cronyism promotes unfair and inefficient employment practices in labor market 
(Ponzo & Scoppa, 2010). Once unqualified labor forces obtain jobs and preferential 
treatments based on their connections, qualified unconnected labor forces are either left 
out of the market or are offered positions that are not suitable for their profile and cannot 
motivate them to engage in productive entrepreneurship within their organizations 
(Prendergast & Topel, 1996; Illoong, 2006). In other words, once cronyism becomes a 
widespread practice even at the organizational level and managers favor connected 
employees regardless of their performance, it discourages corporate entrepreneurship 
efforts by other employees. Additionally, in crony capitalism, since organizations see 
fewer incentives for productive entrepreneurship in the market, they do not reward their 
employees for involvement in corporate entrepreneurship activities. Therefore, in crony 
capitalism, individuals lose motivation for engagement in productive entrepreneurship 
both within and outside existing firms, since, firstly, it may not pay off if they cannot find 
the right connections and appropriate support from powerful individuals within or outside 
their firms, and secondly, if it pays off, their property rights are not guaranteed and they 
cannot reap the benefits of their own talent (Murphy et al., 1991). Griffiths, Kickul, & 
Carsrud (2009) found that stronger perceptions of government corruption are associated 
with lower entrepreneurial intentions. 
Widespread cronyism can also lead to inefficiencies in a country’s educational 
system as it debilitates students’ motivation for developing cognitive skills that are 
required for engagement in productive entrepreneurship (Coco & Lagravinese, 2014). 
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Students have no incentives to prepare themselves for entrepreneurship once they cannot 
see its benefits in their future. In fact, widespread cronyism signals to them to not bother 
with entrepreneurship and encourages them to take on governmental positions that give 
them higher levels of job security and power to participate in the game of exchanging 
favors in the society (Acemoglu & Verdier, 1998). Therefore, cronyism attacks the 
entrepreneurship supply in a society by framing it as an unrewarding and uncontrollable 
career path.  
Entrepreneurial entry and new venture development is by nature an uncertain and 
challenging process. However, to understand why cronyism makes that process 
excessively unpredictable and uncontrollable, one needs to consider the additional 
complications that cronyism produces for entrepreneurial entry and venture development. 
As discussed earlier, cronyism affects new and small businesses that are usually the 
champions of innovation in their countries, more severely than established firms, because 
they are challenged with resource scarcity and liabilities of newness. Resource scarcity 
makes it very difficult for small businesses to participate in political rent seeking and 
public policy efforts that are the norm in a crony capitalism system. Therefore, 
considering new and small firms’ special needs to acquire new licenses and permissions 
for their activities from the government, inability to take part in political games and play 
by rules of the game in crony capitalism, makes it extremely difficult for small firms to 
survive and become profitable (Cook & Barry, 1993).       
Another factor that makes it more difficult to start and grow a new venture in a 
crony capitalism system is that in general small ventures do not have access to the ‘right 
networks’. Aidis, Estrin, & Mickiewicz (2008) explain that: “the strong ties between 
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businesses and state administration in the Russian economy seems to provide greater 
opportunities for existing entrepreneurial insiders to develop new ventures rather than 
newcomers taking the plunge of establishing start-ups. Moreover, entrepreneurial 
outsiders who have attempted to break into the web of business–government relations but 
failed are less likely to try again” (Aidis et al, 2008, p. 657). Similarly, Aidis & Adachi 
(2007) found that networks between business firms and government officials are very 
important for business survival and new ventures without such connections are more 
likely to fail. Therefore, having prior personal ties with powerful individuals in business 
and the government is a major determinant of venture performance in crony capitalism 
(Peng & Luo, 2000).  
Empirical evidence suggests that prior social networks help individuals to decide 
whether they can start a successful business or not. For instance, Román, Congregado, & 
Millán, (2013) found that having a self-employed relative affects individuals’ decision to 
become self-employed as they can count on benefits such as inside information or 
referrals once they are in business. Similarly, Glasser (2004) and Djankov, Qian, Roland, 
& Zhuravskaya (2006) posit that prior social networks play a significant role in 
explaining productive entrepreneurship in Russia and China. For example, in Russia, 
having a father who used to be a member of the communist party increases the chance of 
becoming an entrepreneur. Lack of such networks indicates less chance for cronyism, 
which discourages individuals from starting a new business.  
One last point needs to be clarified here. There is little doubt that having social 
networks (whether dense networks of strong ties or sparse networks of weak ties with 
many structural holes) provides competitive advantages and helps entrepreneurial success 
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in almost every context (Burt, 1992; Coleman, 1988, 1990; Singh et al., 1999). However, 
a crony capitalism context is different in two major ways. First, once cronyism is a 
dominant practice in a context, then benefiting from certain types of networks is not just a 
supporting factor for success, but is the only way for success and without it, survival of 
firms are quite unlikely. Second, in crony capitalism, there is not equal opportunity for 
everybody to build the ‘right networks’ since many of those networks are based on 
individuals’ characteristics (family, friendship, ethnicity, etc.) that individuals either have 
or do not have, and if not they hardly can earn them. Therefore, the problem with crony 
capitalism is that having the ‘right networks’ is excessively important for success (such 
that it cannot be substituted by anything else), and not everybody has an equal chance to 
build those ‘right networks’. This is why cronyism is described as “downside of social 
networking” (Khatri et al., 2003).     
Overall, above discussion indicates that widespread cronyism has several 
destructive effects on supply and allocation of resources to productive entrepreneurship 
within countries. Therefore, I hypothesize that:  
Hypothesis 2: There is a negative relationship between prevalence of cronyism 
in a country and level of productive entrepreneurship in that country.   
Market competition as a mediator  
Market competition refers to the extent to which competitive forces (e.g., rivalry 
among existing firms, threats of new entry, threats of substitute products/services, and 
bargaining power of suppliers/customers) impact firms’ behaviors and determine 
performance in a business context. An important conclusion of above discussion about 
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unique difficulties of starting a business in crony capitalism is that cronyism breeds 
different types of entry barriers for new firms. Parties involved in cronyism make it more 
difficult for new competitors to get into the game, so that they can keep their status quo 
power unthreatened. In fact, building entry barriers for non-favored firms to the benefit of 
favored firms is one major function of cronyism even in developed countries (Aligica & 
Tarko, 2014).  
Moreover, connected firms strive to marginalize competitive forces and disrupt 
market dynamics through their political rent-seeking and lobbying efforts. Favoritism 
provides connected firms with benefits in terms of monopoly powers, tax reliefs, 
preferential funding, protective regulations, and other types of privileges that allow them 
a competitive edge in serving the market (Mitchell, 2013). Therefore, promotion of 
cronyism weakens competitive market forces and leads to the lack of market competition 
and the emergence of several favored business groups controlled by elites (Maman, 2002; 
Rose–Ackerman, 2008). 
 The absence of market competition leads to the presence of rents in markets, 
which promote innovative rent seeking behaviors by both bureaucrats and businesses to 
exploit those rents. Ades & Di Tella (1999) posit that “less competition means firms 
enjoy higher rents, so that bureaucrats with control rights over them, such as tax 
inspectors or regulators, have higher incentives to engage in malfeasant behavior[s]” 
(Ades & Di Tella, 1999, p. 982), such as corruption and other forms of unproductive 
entrepreneurship. In perfect competition, firms exhaust their resources to keep up with 
their competitors and they have no excess resources/profits to invest in unproductive and 
corrupt efforts such as lobbying and bribing (Bliss & Di Tella, 1997). Hence, high 
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competition reduces the return on such unproductive rent seeking behaviors (Ades & Di 
Tella, 1999; Emerson, 2006). 
As discussed, cronyism can produce excessive regulations that undermine market 
competition. Such uncompetitive markets encourage individuals to get involved in 
unproductive and corrupt efforts to find shortcuts and ways to bend the rules and evade 
costs of regulations (Holcombe, 2013). For instance, Djankov et al. (2002) examined 
entry regulations in 85 countries and reported that nations with more regulative entry 
barriers have more corruption and larger informal economies, indicating in less 
competitive contexts, excessive entry regulations promote unproductive and corrupt 
economic activities. Regulatory capture theory (Stigler, 1971) explains how regulations 
fail to serve public interest and end up benefiting regulated economic actors in the long 
run. Once certain regulations are set, economic players adjust their behaviors in the short 
term, but in the long term they develop relationships with regulatory agencies and get 
involved in unproductive entrepreneurial efforts to influence regulations and capture 
value at the expense of the public. Therefore, highly regulated uncompetitive markets 
promote unproductive entrepreneurship.   
Additionally, lack of competitive forces allow favored business groups to be able 
to survive and flourish even without doing their best and pushing themselves to develop 
efficient business practices/routines as hard as they would push in a competitive context. 
In the absence of competition, firms’ payoffs for investment in innovation and productive 
entrepreneurship are negligible and they do not see the need for such investments (Singh 
& Zammit, 2006). This is generally called X-inefficiency (Leibenstein, 1996) and results 
in existence of protected industries that reward poor firm performance. For instance, 
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Lenway et al. (1996) investigated US steel firms’ performance and surprisingly reported 
that “high past R&D spending is negatively correlated with stock price changes when 
[trade] protection is announced, and positively correlated with subsequent exit from the 
industry” (p. 410), indicating that trade protection in the US steel industry, which 
undermines competitive forces, decreases incentives of productive entrepreneurship.  
Low market competition, resulting from the prevalence of cronyism, endangers 
consumer welfare significantly, since consumers do not have access to high quality 
products/services that they would have had in a competitive market. They even may end 
up paying higher prices for lower quality products/services that are offered to them 
exclusively by favored firms (Thierer & Skorup, 2013). In contrast, enhanced 
competition makes firms more efficient and innovative and serves consumer welfare as 
they are offered innovative products and services at more reasonable prices (Rey, 1997; 
Dutz, Ordover, & Willig, 2000).  
In a competitive market firms are forced by their existing competitors to be 
proactive and have higher rates of product/process innovations to maintain pace with 
competition. Higher threats of new entries and substitutes make firms in a competitive 
environment more competitively aggressive toward potential new rivalries and act more 
entrepreneurial to keep their competitive positions in the market.  This is called “Red 
Queen” competition, in which firms that are exposed to more intense market competition 
adopt a more innovative approach compared to those that are exposed to less intense 
market competition (Barnett Sorenson, 2002; Barnett & McKendrick, 2004). Baumol 
(2004) posited that the Red Queen effect is the most important development mechanism 
in Capitalistic societies. Derfus and her colleagues (2008) explain that:  
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“Red Queen can be seen as a contest in which each firm’s performance depends 
on the firm’s matching or exceeding the actions of rivals. In these contests, 
performance increases gained by one firm as a result of innovative actions tend to 
lead to a performance decrease in other firms. The only way rival firms in such 
competitive races can maintain their performance relative to others is by taking 
actions of their own. Each firm is forced by the others in an industry to participate 
in continuous and escalating actions and development that are such that all the 
firms end up racing as fast as they can just to stand still relative to competitors.” 
(Derfus, Maggitti, Grimm, & Smith, 2008, p. 61) 
Higher levels of competitions and lower levels of entry barriers are beneficial to 
both revolutionary and evolutionary productive entrepreneurship (Dutz et al., 2000). 
Once new firms can enter more easily, they are willing to undertake radical innovative 
initiatives to gain a competitive position in the market and such threats of new entry 
make existing firms take more evolutionary productive entrepreneurship to avoid losing 
their market power. Additionally, higher competition means that entrepreneurs have 
better access to high-quality suppliers and supporting business services, which provide 
them stronger support and incentives to engage in productive entrepreneurship. 
In sum, the above discussion indicates that cronyism in a country leads to lower 
levels of competitions in the country’s local markets, which then increases the level of 
unproductive entrepreneurship and decreases the level of productive entrepreneurship in 
that country. Hence, I hypothesize that:  
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Hypothesis 3(a): The positive relationship between cronyism and unproductive 
entrepreneurship is partially mediated by market competition, such that, a high 
level of cronyism reduces market competition which then, in turn, increases the 
level of unproductive entrepreneurship at national level. 
Hypothesis 3(b): The negative relationship between cronyism and productive 
entrepreneurship is partially mediated by market competition, such that, a high 
level of cronyism reduces market competition which then, in turn, decreases the 
level of productive entrepreneurship at national level.             
Institutional trust as a mediator 
As discussed earlier, prevalence of cronyism among businesses and between 
businesses and governments hurts the credibility of both sides (Mitchell, 2013). Through 
repeated experience with businesses and the government, potential entrepreneurs learn 
about rules of the game and whether they can count on fairness and neutrality of 
institutions or if they need to be involved in cronyism to be successful. Once cronyism is 
a dominant practice, it promotes exchange of unfair favors and advantages between the 
government and businesses. Cronyism also increases the level of political rent-seeking 
activities and circumvention of laws and regulation by connected entrepreneurs. 
Consequently, people lose confidence in the ability and intention of the government and 
market institutions to reliably and neutrally enforce trade rules, or simply they lose their 
trust in institutions (Anokhin & Schulze, 2009).  
Institutional trust refers to “wide-spread confidence that office holders and others 
who are directly and indirectly party to a transaction will, regardless of their identity, 
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impartially and fairly enforce the rules that govern exchange” (Anokhin & Schulze, 2009, 
p. 3). It represents the level of trust that people have in the satisfactory performance of 
institutional environment, including formal and informal institutions (Welter & 
Smallbone, 2006). Entrepreneurs’ trust in institutions may include different aspects, such 
as confidence in effective management of institutions, or trust in credibility of decision 
makers, or confidence in functionality and usefulness of the institutions (De Clercq & 
Dakhli, 2009). Institutional trust is shown to have a positive relationship with people’s 
well-being in general (Hudson, 2006) and entrepreneurs’ loyalty to ethical standards in 
particular (De Clercq & Dakhli, 2009). Institutional trust is essential for occurrence of 
efficient transactions within a market economy as it enables entrepreneurs to get into 
transactions with partners, whom they have little information about, without much 
concern about opportunism from partners (Raiser, 1999).     
Institutional trust is different than interpersonal trust, and is defined as an agent’s 
personal confidence that another agent will behave in a way that is expected (Williamson, 
1993). Interpersonal trust is a result of a history of repeated interactions among particular 
individuals or knowledge about certain individuals’ reputation, however, institutional 
trust precedes such interactions and helps individuals to interact in the first place without 
prior knowledge about each other’s reputation (Luhmann, 1988; Rus & Iglič, 2005). In 
other words, institutional trust “generalizes beyond a given transaction and beyond 
specific sets of exchange partners” (Zucker, 1986, p. 63) and serves as a foundation that 
facilitates the development of interpersonal trust among citizens (Rose-Ackerman, 2001).  
A mixture/balance of both types of trust, interpersonal and institutional, is 
required for promoting efficient and innovative economic transactions in a country 
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(Welter & Smallbone, 2006). However, cronyism can disrupt the mixture/balance of both 
types of trust in a society and consequently constrain economic activities in that context. 
Interpersonal trust among certain groups of individuals is the basis for practicing 
cronyism. An exchange of favor between two parties happens based on their 
interpersonal trust and the belief that the party who receives the favor will reciprocate in 
an appropriate way in the future. Hence, interpersonal trust initiates cronyism, which 
undermines people’s trust in fairness and functionality of the system, or their institutional 
trust. Low levels of institutional trust in a society prevents individuals from doing 
business with unknown others and building interpersonal trust with new people through 
their interactions. Therefore, cronyism disrupts the mixture/balance of both types of trust 
in a society by decreasing institutional trust in a context, which makes it more difficult 
for agents to engage in interactions that help to build interpersonal trust with new 
individuals, and increasing people’s reliance on those with whom they have interpersonal 
trust, which leads to more cronyism and reinforcement of the same disruptive 
mechanism. 
As Baumol (1990) suggests, once potential entrepreneurs find institutions to be 
effective and fair in supporting them and facilitating their paths to achieve their goals, 
they would prefer to follow legitimate rather than illegitimate paths toward 
accomplishment of their goals. However, “when people perceive institutional 
arrangements as unfair and arbitrary, they may feel alienated from the social structure in 
which they are embedded and therefore consider socially accepted norms as less 
instrumental to accomplish their personal goals” (De Clercq & Dakhli, 2009, p. 481). 
Hence, people who do not have trust in the functionality and impartiality of institutions to 
75  
provide supporting resources and valuable opportunities for citizens, are prone to 
discount their ethical standards and use their talents to find innovative illegitimate ways 
for fulfilling their self-interest (Dakhli & De Clercq, 2004; De Clercq & Dakhli, 2009). 
Therefore, low levels of institutional trust promote unproductive entrepreneurship that 
rewards individuals who seek their own interest at the expense of society.        
Additionally, absent institutional trust, high transaction costs limit the scale and 
scope of economic trade and thus hinder economic growth and investment in productive 
entrepreneurship (Anokhin, & Schulze, 2009). Higher levels of institutional trust 
facilitate the development of arms-length exchanges and enable entrepreneurs to expand 
their scope of interactions by helping them to choose from a wider pool of economic 
partners. Rus & Iglič (2005) studied small- and medium-sized firms in Slovenia and 
Bosnia- Herzegovina to understand how the level of entrepreneurs’ institutional and 
interpersonal trust influences their choice of governance mechanisms. They found that in 
Slovenia “the use of institutional trust as a basis for a governance mechanism may lead to 
increased economic performance of companies due to the inclusive nature of sociability 
patterns and tie formation since institutions generalize trust beyond a specific set of 
exchange partners.” (Rus & Iglič, 2005, p. 371). In contrast, in Bosnia- Herzegovina “the 
use of interpersonal trust may limit economic potential due to its reliance on strong ties 
embedded within cohesive groups marked with closure.” (Rus & Iglič, 2005, p. 371). 
Lack of institutional trust promotes doing business based on alternative foundations such 
as kinship, or ethnicity, which are not only restrictive for existing entrepreneurs, but also 
as discussed earlier, promotes cronyism and makes it more difficult for potential 
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entrepreneurs who do not have access to such networks (gunaxi, blat, etc.) to enter to the 
entrepreneurship sector (Puffer et al., 2010; Aidis et al., 2008).      
In presence of high institutional trust, not every business transactions is required 
to be regulated by contracts and government interference, which leads to lower 
transaction costs for entrepreneurs and higher returns to productive entrepreneurship 
(Baumol, 1990). Therefore, high levels of institutional trust signal that relative rewards 
for productive entrepreneurship are high and secured, and encourage individuals to invest 
in productive entrepreneurship. Once individuals are confident that their property rights 
are secured and are less afraid to get hurt by governments’ and businesses’ opportunistic 
behaviors and unfair practices, they find more incentives to get involved in innovation 
and productive entrepreneurship. For instance, institutional trust is known to play a 
significant role in the expansion of online businesses and electronic markets such as Ebay 
or Craigslist (Patnasingam, Gefen, & Pavlou, 2005).  
Overall, the theory presented here indicates that higher levels of cronyism in a 
country decreases the level of institutional trust among citizens, which then leads to 
higher levels unproductive entrepreneurship and lower levels of productive 
entrepreneurship in that country. Therefore, I hypothesize that:  
Hypothesis 4(a): The positive relationship between cronyism and unproductive 
entrepreneurship is partially mediated by institutional trust, such that, a high 
level of cronyism reduces institutional trust which then, in turn, increases the 
level of unproductive entrepreneurship at national level. 
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Hypothesis 4(b): The negative relationship between cronyism and productive 
entrepreneurship is partially mediated by institutional trust, such that, a high 
level of cronyism reduces institutional trust which then, in turn, decreases the 
level of productive entrepreneurship at national level. 

















This study collects secondary data from several different sources to analyze its 
conceptual model. These data sources include: Global Competitiveness Index reported by 
World Economic Forum (Sala-I-Martin et al., 2010), Worldwide Governance Indicators 
developed by World Bank Groups (Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2010), and 
Corruption Perception Index reported by Transparency International (Lambsdorff, 2008). 
In following sections, these data sources are briefly explained and the measures borrowed 
from each data source are described. 
Global Competitiveness Index (GCI) 
A majority of this study’s measures are adopted from the GCI that was developed 
and reported by the World Economic Forum (WEF) for more than a decade. 
Competitiveness is defined as “the set of institutions, policies, and factors that determine 
the level of productivity of an economy, which in turn sets the level of prosperity that the 
country can earn” (The Global Competitiveness Report 2015, p. 4). Hence, the GCI 
represents key factors that determine economic growth and a country’s level of present 
and future prosperity. GCI combines 114 country-level indicators that are grouped into 
12 pillars: institutions, infrastructure, macroeconomic environment, health and primary
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education, higher education and training, goods market efficiency, labor market 
efficiency, financial market development, technological readiness, market size, business 
sophistication, and innovation. 
GCI includes statistical data from a variety of legitimate data sources 
(internationally recognized agencies such as, International Monetary Fund (IMF), United 
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), and World Health 
Organization). Also, in many cases that require more qualitative assessments or the data 
is not available, GCI indicators are derived from the Executive Opinion Survey, which is 
a global annual survey that has been conducted by the WEF for the last 40 years. The 
Executive Opinion Survey is a national survey of representative samples of executives in 
more than 140 countries (on average 100 executives from different sectors in each 
country), which produces average national scores on different topics for each country. 
The Executive Opinion Survey’s methodology has been validated throughout the years 
with the help of Gallup’s survey experts. Scholars have extensively adopted these 
average national scores in studies that are published in top management and 
entrepreneurship journals (e.g. Wan & Hoskisson, 2003; Ho & Wong, 2006; Shaner & 
Maznevski, 2011; Stenholm, Acs, & Wuebker, 2013).  
World Governance Indicators (WGI) 
This is a World Bank’s research dataset that summarizes assessments of quality of 
governance in different countries. The WGI is based on data from 31 data sources that 
report perceptions of governance among large numbers of survey respondents and experts 
worldwide. The data is gathered from a variety of survey institutes, think tanks, non-
governmental organizations, internationally-recognized organizations, and private sector 
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firms. A detail explanation of WGI methodology is offered by Kaufmann, Kraay, & 
Mastruzzi (2010).  
Kaufmann et al. (2010) define governance as “the traditions and institutions by 
which authority in a country is exercised. This includes (a) the process by which 
governments are selected, monitored and replaced; (b) the capacity of the government to 
effectively formulate and implement sound policies; and (c) the respect of citizens and 
the state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them.” 
(Kaufmann et al., 2010, p. 4). Based on this definition, they construct six measures of 
governance, namely, Voice and Accountability, Political Stability and Absence of 
Violence/Terrorism, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, and 
Control of Corruption. WGI offer annual national scores on each of these six measures 
for more than 200 countries in a time frame between 1996 and 2013. These scores have 
been extensively used in prior studies published in top management and entrepreneurship 
journals (e.g. Jandhyala, 2013; Kim & Li, 2014; Saeed, Yousafzai, & Engelen, 2014; Sun 
& Im, 2015).             
Corruption Perception Index (CPI) 
The CPI is a widely used proxy for measurement and comparison of the level of 
corruption among different countries. CPI has been reported by Transparency 
International for more than a decade and contains scores on how corrupt the public sector 
of a country is perceived to be (Lambsdorff, 2008). CPI is a composite index that 
combines data on perception of corruption in different countries from a variety of surveys 
and assessments of corruption by internationally-recognized organizations (e.g., World 
Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional Assessment, Transparency International’s Bribe 
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Payers Survey). Similar to other data sources described above, CPI is also extensively 
adopted by scholars in studies that appear in top management and entrepreneurship 
journals (e.g., Aidis, Estrin, & Mickiewicz, 2008; McMullen, Bagby, & Palich, 2008; 
Gohmann, 2012; Payne, Moore, Bell, & Zachary, 2013).        
Measures 
Based on the theoretical definition of each construct, the three most appropriate 
available variables in the previously described datasets were chosen to form reflective 
latent constructs that are able to capture variability of the study’s desired concept at the 
country level. In this section, final measures for each construct are described. Table 4 
summarizes these measures, their definitions, scales, and data sources. 
Table 4 - Measurement Variables 
# Measurement variables (definition, scale, source) 
Cronyism  
1 
Favoritism in decisions of government officials 
 In your country, to what extent do government officials show favoritism to well-
connected firms and individuals when deciding upon policies and contracts?  
[1 = always show favoritism; 7 = never show favoritism] 
Source: World Economic Forum, Global Competitiveness Index, adopted from Executive Opinion 
Survey 
2 
Favoritism in appointing managers 
 In your country, who holds senior management positions?  
[1 = usually relatives or friends without regard to merit; 7 = mostly professional 
managers chosen for merit and qualifications] 
Source: World Economic Forum, Global Competitiveness Index, adopted from Executive Opinion 
Survey 
3 Undue influence on judiciary system 
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 In your country, to what extent is the judiciary independent from influences of 
members of government, citizens, or firms? 
[1 = heavily influenced; 7 = entirely independent] 
Source: World Economic Forum, Global Competitiveness Index, adopted from Executive Opinion 
Survey 
 Market Competition 
1 
Intensity of local competition 
 In your country, how intense is competition in the local markets? 
[1 = not intense at all; 7 = extremely intense] 
Source: World Economic Forum, Global Competitiveness Index, adopted from Executive Opinion 
Survey 
2 
Effectiveness of anti-monopoly policy 
 In your country, to what extent does anti-monopoly policy promote competition? 
[1 = does not promote competition; 7 = effectively promotes competition] 
Source: World Economic Forum, Global Competitiveness Index, adopted from Executive Opinion 
Survey 
3 
Extent of market dominance 
 In your country, how would you characterize corporate activity? 
[1 = dominated by a few business groups; 7 = spread among many firms] 
Source: World Economic Forum, Global Competitiveness Index, adopted from Executive Opinion 
Survey 
Institutional Trust  
1 
Government effectiveness 
 Reflects perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil 
service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of 
policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's 
commitment to such policies. 
[ranges from -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong)] 
Source: World Bank, World Governance Indicators 
2 
Rule of law 
 Reflects perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide 
by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, 
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property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and 
violence. 
[ranges from -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong)] 
Source: World Bank, World Governance Indicators 
3 
Regulatory quality 
 Reflects perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement 
sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector 
development. 
[ranges from -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong)] 
Source: World Bank, World Governance Indicators 
 Productive Entrepreneurship  
 1 
Capacity for innovation 
 In your country, to what extent do companies have the capacity to innovate? 
[1 = not at all; 7 = to a great extent] 
Source: World Economic Forum, Global Competitiveness Index, adopted from Executive Opinion 
Survey 
 2 
Company spending on R&D 
 In your country, to what extent do companies spend on research and 
development (R&D)? 
[1 = do not spend on R&D; 7 = spend heavily on R&D] 
Source: World Economic Forum, Global Competitiveness Index, adopted from Executive Opinion 
Survey 
3 
PCT patent applications 
 Number of applications filed under the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) per 
million population 
Source: World Economic Forum, Global Competitiveness Report, adopted from Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Patent Database 
4 
New business density  
 New businesses registered (the number of new limited liability corporations 
registered in the calendar year) divided by population. 
[New business registrations per 1,000 people ages 15-64] 
Source: World Bank Group Entrepreneurship Survey (WBGES) 
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 5 
High-technology exports  
 High-technology exports are products with high R&D intensity, such as in 
aerospace, computers, pharmaceuticals, scientific instruments, and electrical 
machinery. 
[High technology exports as % of all manufactured exports] 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators, adopted from United Nations, Comtrade 
database 
6  
Research and development expenditure  
 Expenditures for research and development are current and capital expenditures 
(both public and private) on creative work undertaken systematically to increase 
knowledge, including knowledge of humanity, culture, and society, and the use 
of knowledge for new applications. R&D covers basic research, applied 
research, and experimental development. 
[R&D expenditure as % of GDP] 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators, adopted from United Nations Educational, 
Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Institute for Statistics 
 7 
Researchers in R&D  
 Researchers in R&D are professionals engaged in the conception or creation of 
new knowledge, products, processes, methods, or systems and in the 
management of the projects concerned. Postgraduate PhD students (ISCED97 
level 6) engaged in R&D are included. 
[Researchers in R&D per million people] 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators, adopted from United Nations Educational, 
Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Institute for Statistics  
8  
Technicians in R&D  
 Technicians in R&D and equivalent staff are people whose main tasks require 
technical knowledge and experience in engineering, physical and life sciences 
(technicians), or social sciences and humanities (equivalent staff). They 
participate in R&D by performing scientific and technical tasks involving the 
application of concepts and operational methods, normally under the supervision 
of researchers. 
[Technicians in R&D per million people] 
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Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators, adopted from United Nations Educational, 
Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Institute for Statistics  
 Unproductive Entrepreneurship  
1 
Control of corruption 
 Reflects perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private 
gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of 
the state by elites and private interests. 
[ranges from -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong)] 
Source: World Bank, World Governance Indicators 
 2 
Corruption Perception Index (CPI) 
 The CPI score represents how corrupt a country’s public sector is perceived to 
be.  
[A scale of 0-100, where 0 means that a country is perceived as highly corrupt and a 100 
means that a country is perceived as very clean] 
Source: Transparency International, Corruption Perception Index  
3 
Irregular payments and bribes 
 Average score across the five components: In your country, how common is it 
for firms to make undocumented extra payments or bribes in connection with (a) 
imports and exports; (b) public utilities; (c) annual tax payments; (d) awarding 
of public contracts and licenses; (e) obtaining favorable judicial decisions? 
[1 = very common; 7 = never occurs] 
Source: World Economic Forum, Global Competitiveness Index, adopted from Executive Opinion 
Survey 
Cronyism (Independent Variable) 
Objective measurement of cronyism at a national level is a difficult task. The 
parties who are involved in cronyism seek to hide it or justify it as best for the public 
interest, consumer protection, or other types of rationales for favoring some people over 
others. If parties who are involved in cronyism want to deny their participation in 
cronyism, no one can definitively accuse them that they favor someone else based on 
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their connection and in hope of future compensations. This is why cronyism is not illegal 
and there are no court or indictment records for it. Therefore, it is vital for researchers to 
develop appropriate proxies that enable them to capture the variability of cronyism.    
Prior research on cronyism has used different proxies to measure cronyism, such 
as concentration of country’s assets in hands of small groups, inattention to consumer 
needs in business contexts, stock-market event analysis for investigation of the effects of 
political connections on stock prices, capital structure of state capitols, or campaign 
contributions by political action committees (Smith & Sutter, 2012). While each of these 
proxies represent different consequences of cronyism and are able to capture the level of 
cronyism in a country to some extent, this study adopts a different approach by using 
citizen’s ‘average perception of prevalence of cronyism’ as an effective measure of 
cronyism in a country. 
Baumol (1990) posits that individuals choose to engage in productive versus 
unproductive entrepreneurship by comparing rewards they gain in each path. This 
indicates that individuals decide to engage in certain activities based on their subjective 
evaluation of rewards that they can earn in each type of activity. Therefore, individuals’ 
perception about prevalence of cronyism and its importance for success influence their 
subjective evaluations of relative return to productive versus unproductive 
entrepreneurship. In other words, it is indeed individuals’ perception of cronyism that 
influences their judgment and choice of behavior rather than any other reliable objective 
measure of cronyism, meaning that perception of cronyism is an appropriate measure to 
study cronyism’s effects on people’s behavior.  
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In line with this reasoning, Smith & Sutter (2012) also suggest that perception of 
cronyism is an appropriate measure for the level of cronyism, since “in fact, just the 
perception of cronyism can inhibit business formation, [and] distort the allocation of 
entrepreneurial talent” (p. 25). Similarly, Illoong (2006) points out that it is ‘perceived 
favoritism’ within an organization that decreases organizational members’ motivation for 
innovation and effective contributions to the organization. Therefore, I submit that a 
measure of the perception of cronyism is an appropriate proxy for capturing the 
variability of prevalence of cronyism in different countries.  
To form a construct that is able to measure the level of cronyism’s perception in 
different countries, three variables from GCI are selected. These variables are all adopted 
from WEF’s Executive Opinion Survey. 
 Favoritism in decisions of government officials 
o In your country, to what extent do government officials show favoritism to 
well-connected firms and individuals when deciding upon policies and 
contracts?  
[1 = always show favoritism; 7 = never show favoritism] 
 Favoritism in appointing managers 
o In your country, who holds senior management positions?  
[1 = usually relatives or friends without regard to merit; 7 = mostly 
professional managers chosen for merit and qualifications]  
 Undue influence on judiciary system 
o In your country, to what extent is the judiciary independent from 
influences of members of government, citizens, or firms? 
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[1 = heavily influenced; 7 = entirely independent]  
The first variable measures the extent to which people perceive that cronyism 
exists in the government sector, the second variable measures people’s perception of the 
prevalence of cronyism in the private sector, and finally, the third variable is a proxy for 
people’s perception of how much cronyism exists in the judiciary system. Overall, the 
latent reflective construct that is identified by these three measures is able to strongly 
capture variability of the average perception of prevalence of cronyism within a country.  
Market Competition (Mediator) 
The current study is interested in the general level of competition in country’s 
different local markets. In other words, the extent to which market dynamics/forces (e.g., 
rivalry among existing firms, threats of new entry, threats of substitute products/services, 
bargaining power of suppliers and customers) influence firms’ behaviors and determine 
business performance in different markets. Executives’ common perception of how 
different local markets in a country are governed by market competitive forces (market-
based competition among the economic players) and free of non-market-based dynamics 
(e.g. governmental interferences, monopoly power, etc.) can capture the variability of 
general market competition within a country. 
Common perception about the level of market competition in a country signals 
potential entrepreneurs about the fairness of competition in that country and the level of 
uncompetitive forces that challenge them once they are in business. It is indeed the 
entrepreneurs’ perceptions of the quality of market competition that influence their 
choice of behavior (productive versus unproductive entrepreneurship). Therefore, this 
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study adopts the three most theoretically fit measures from the list of GCI’s indicators for 
goods market efficiency at country-level. These measures include: 
 Intensity of local competition 
o In your country, how intense is competition in the local markets? 
[1 = not intense at all; 7 = extremely intense] 
 Effectiveness of anti-monopoly policy 
o In your country, to what extent does anti-monopoly policy promote 
competition? 
[1 = does not promote competition; 7 = effectively promotes competition] 
 Extent of market dominance 
o In your country, how would you characterize corporate activity? 
[1 = dominated by a few business groups; 7 = spread among many firms] 
Institutional Trust (Mediator) 
Institutional trust is defined as a “wide-spread confidence that office holders and 
others who are directly and indirectly party to a transaction will, regardless of their 
identity, impartially and fairly enforce the rules that govern exchange” (Anokhin & 
Schulze, 2009, p. 3). Hence, to measure institutional trust, this study adopts three 
governance measures from WGI that are proxies for “(b) the capacity of the government 
to effectively formulate and implement sound policies; and (c) the respect of citizens and 
the state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them.” 
(Kaufmann et al., 2010, p. 4). The reflective latent construct formed by these three 
governance indicators is able to strongly capture variability of institutional trust 
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(considering its above mention definition) in different countries. These indicators 
include: 
 Government effectiveness 
o Reflects perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the 
civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, 
the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility 
of the government's commitment to such policies. 
[Ranges from -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong)] 
 Regulatory quality 
o Reflects perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and 
implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private 
sector development. 
[Ranges from -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong)] 
 Rule of law 
o Reflects perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and 
abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract 
enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the 
likelihood of crime and violence. 
[Ranges from -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong)] 
Productive Entrepreneurship (Dependent Variable) 
Prior research used different proxies to measure the level of Productive 
Entrepreneurship (PE) at the national level. Stenholm et al. (2013) reviewed different 
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measures for country-level entrepreneurial activities in prior studies and explained that 
these measures are either based on aggregation of self-reports of randomly selected 
individuals in a country (e.g., OECD data on self-employment, or GEM data on self-
employment or early stage entrepreneurial activities) or records from business registries 
(e.g., World Bank Group Entrepreneurship Survey (WBGES), or OECD Comparable 
Entrepreneurship Data for International Analysis-COMPENDIA). This study adopts a 
mixed approach to ensure the robustness of its results.  
Firstly, the three most theoretically fit measures of productive entrepreneurship 
are chosen from the variables that are suggested by GCI as indicators of innovation pillar 
at the country-level. This option provides the study with higher sample size and stronger 
statistical power. The reflective latent construct formed by these three measures is able to 
account for variability of innovation capacity in a country. These three measures include:       
 Capacity for innovation 
o In your country, to what extent do companies have the capacity to 
innovate? 
[1 = not at all; 7 = to a great extent] 
 Company spending on R&D 
o In your country, to what extent do companies spend on research and 
development (R&D)? 
[1 = do not spend on R&D; 7 = spend heavily on R&D] 
 PCT patent applications 
o Number of applications filed under the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) 
per million population 
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Additionally, to insure robustness of the study’s results about productive 
entrepreneurship, the study adopts a few other common measures, including, new 
business density (as a proxy for entrepreneurial new entry), high-technology export (as a 
proxy for high-technology innovation capacity), R&D expenditure (as a proxy for 
investment on PE), Researchers in R&D (as a proxy for encouraging labor force to 
engage in PE rather than UE), and Technicians in R&D (as a proxy for encouraging 
labor force to engage in PE rather than UE). These variables are adopted from World 
Bank Group Entrepreneurship Survey (WBGES) and World Bank Group’s World 
Development Indicators, which are both extensively used in studies that appear in top 
level management and entrepreneurship journals (e.g., Jandhyala, 2013; Stenholm et al., 
2013; Kim & Li, 2014).  
Unproductive Entrepreneurship (Dependent Variable) 
Unlike productive entrepreneurship, prior research fails to suggest appropriate 
proxies that are able to measure the level of unproductive entrepreneurship within a 
country3. In fact, it is very difficult to build an objective measure of unproductive 
entrepreneurship that is able to capture how often individuals in a country come up with 
innovative ways of redistributing wealth to themselves at the expense of society. These 
efforts are mostly under the radar and unproductive entrepreneurs do not publicize their 
efforts. Also, there are rarely court records for a majority of these efforts, since they are 
not considered as illegal activities per se, but innovative ways to bend legal procedures. 
                                                          
3- The only proxy that is used by very few studies for this purpose, is the level of a country’s talents that 
enter into law/legal studies and businesses, instead of engineering and science careers (e.g. Murphy et al., 
1991; Sobel, 2008).  
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This study examines the level of a country’s corruption as a proxy for measuring 
unproductive entrepreneurship. Unproductive entrepreneurship is mostly categorized 
under the rubric of corruption and perceived as corrupt behaviors by the general 
population. Therefore, average perception of the level of corruption in a country can be a 
proxy for measuring the level of unproductive entrepreneurship. I certainly acknowledge 
that this is a serious limitation of this study and not all types of corruption (e.g., bribery) 
are unproductive entrepreneurship, but as explained, there is no better alternative proxy 
available at this point. Hence, this study forms a reflective latent construct as a proxy for 
unproductive entrepreneurship using these three corruption variables from WGI, GCI, 
and CPI:   
 Control of corruption 
o Reflects perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for 
private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as 
"capture" of the state by elites and private interests. 
[Ranges from -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong)] 
 Irregular payments and bribes 
o Average score across the five components: In your country, how common 
is it for firms to make undocumented extra payments or bribes in 
connection with (a) imports and exports; (b) public utilities; (c) annual tax 
payments; (d) awarding of public contracts and licenses; (e) obtaining 
favorable judicial decisions? 
[1 = very common; 7 = never occurs] 
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 Corruption Perception Index (CPI) 
o The CPI score represents how corrupt a country’s public sector is 
perceived to be.  
[A scale of 0-100, where 0 means that a country is perceived as highly 
corrupt and a 100 means that a country is perceived as very clean] 
Measurement Model 
The data sources adopted in this study provide data for multiple years. Hence, the 
first step to build the study’s measurement model is to choose a base year for analysis. 
Two factors are considered for making this decision, first, statistical power (sample size), 
and second, probable effects of World’s 2008-2009 financial crisis. Based on these two 
considerations, the year 2011 is chosen as the base year for analysis. Moreover, as a 
common suggested practice for examination of causal paths, a one year lag is considered 
between different layers of the study’s conceptual model, meaning that, data analysis is 
performed with IV’s data for 2011, mediators’ data for 2012, and DVs’ data for 2013. 
The next step to test for reliability and validity of the study’s measures is to build 
the study’s measurement model and run Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA). For this 
purpose, the study used maximum likelihood estimation with Proc Calis procedure in 
SAS Enterprise Guide 7.11. A CFA model that includes the study’s five latent constructs 
and three observed measures for each construct was built. The study chose to keep only 
three best measures for each construct to insure model convergence considering the 
study’s relatively small sample size and high numbers of tested relationships. As a 
common practice, all constructs’ variances were set to one to run CFA.   
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Table 5 shows final list of observed measures for each construct, standardized 
factor loadings and their t-values (t > 2, p < 0.05), Cronbach Alpha, Composite 
Reliability (CR), and Average Variance Extracted (AVE) for all constructs and their 
observed measures. All Cronbach Alpha and CR values are higher than 0.80 and exceed 
their suggested thresholds, respectively, 0.70 and 0.60, which provide strong support for 
reliability of the measures (Bagozzi & Yi, 2012). Moreover, all loading factors are 
significant and higher than 0.80, which insure convergent validity of each construct’s 
measures. Moreover, AVE values for all latent constructs are higher than 0.75 and larger 
than each construct’s shared variance with other constructs, which satisfy discriminant 
validity of constructs (Fornell & Larcker, 1981).         
Table 5 - Measurement Model (CFA Results) 
Latent Constructs’ Measurement Items Loading 
(t –
value) 
Cronyism (Cronbach Alpha=0.92, CR=0.84, AVE=0.81) 
 Favoritism in decisions of government officials 0.88  (39.96) 
 Favoritism in appointing managers 0.89  (44.92) 
 Undue influence on judiciary system 0.93  (63.27) 
Market Competition (Cronbach Alpha= 0.93, CR=0.83, AVE=0.77) 
 Intensity of local competition 0.83  (27.39) 
 Effectiveness of anti-monopoly policy 0.92  (52.19) 
 Extent of market dominance 0.88  (37.66) 
Institutional Trust (Cronbach Alpha= 0.98, CR=0.86, AVE=0.94) 
 Government effectiveness 0.98  (200.6) 
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 Rule of law 0.98  (258.2) 
 Regulatory quality 0.94  (90.72) 
Productive Entrepreneurship (Cronbach Alpha=0.95, CR=0.85, AVE=0.86) 
 Capacity for innovation 0.99  (160.0) 
 Company spending on R&D 0.97  (133.1) 
 PCT patent applications 0.82  (27.71) 
Unproductive Entrepreneurship (Cronbach Alpha=0.98, CR=0.86, AVE=0.94) 
 Control of corruption 0.99  (701.8) 
 Corruption Perception Index (CPI) 0.99  (573.8) 
 Irregular payments and bribes 0.92  (65.62) 
The measurement model’s goodness of fit is investigated through chi-square 
statistics, a set of relative fit indices, and a set of absolute fit indices. Chi-square test is 
almost always significant in studies with highly restricted models and large sample sizes, 
hence, other tests are explored to examine the measurement model’s goodness of fit. 
Prior research suggests that a chi-square/DF ratio below 5 indicate an acceptable level of 
fit between model and data (Hooper, Coughlan, & Mullen, 2008). This ratio (Chi-
square/DF = 257.82/80) equals 3.22 in this case, which meets the recommended 
threshold. Moreover, values for a commonly used absolute fit index (Standardized Root 
Mean Square Residual (SRMR) = 0.03) and relative fit indices (Comparative Fit Index 
(CFI) = 0.95, Non-normed Fit Index (NNFI) = 0.93), which are less sensitive to sample 
size (Bentler, 1990), indicate acceptable fit between the model and the data. In 
conclusion, the above results provide strong support for the study’s measurement model 
validity and reliability.   
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Table 6 presents the constructs’ descriptive statistics. Since data is gathered from 
several datasets that each have different scales, all measures are standardized (mean = 0, 
SD = 1) to make comparison both clear and possible. All variables are coded in positive 
direction (higher cronyism values indicate less perception of cronyism, and higher UE 
values indicate less prevalence of UE). The final sample size for the analysis is 132, 
meaning that the study includes data for 132 countries worldwide. The study’s sample 
includes a variety of developed, transition, and developing economies from all 
regions/continents of the world. 
Table 6 - Descriptive Statistics 










Cronyism 0  (0.93) 
-1.93280 


















(3.34265) 0.77 0.77 0.76 1 
Unproductiv




(2.28055) 0.89 0.74 0.94 0.75 
N=132, All correlations are significant at p<0.001 
Conceptual Model 
Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) is the analytical method that this study uses 
to test its hypotheses. SEM is an appropriate choice for this study because of its ability to 
analyze reflective latent constructs and trace multiple mediation paths simultaneously in 
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theoretical models. The study builds its conceptual model in two incremental stages to 
better understand the quality and strength of its hypothesized direct and mediated paths.  
In first stage, SEM analysis tests for direct effects of cronyism on PE and UE. 
Figure 3 shows this model. Model’s goodness of fit indices indicate acceptable level of fit 
between this model and data (Chi-square/DF = 3.85, SRMR = 0.03, CFI = 0.96, NNFI = 
0.94). Cronyism has a positive significant relationship with UE (β= 0.91, p-value < 
0.001), meaning that, lower perception of cronyism leads to less engagement in 
unproductive entrepreneurship. This finding provides strong support for H1. Also, there 
is a significant negative relationship between cronyism and PE (β= 0.80, p-value < 
0.001), indicating that, lower levels of cronyism promote higher levels of PE. This 
finding provides strong support for H2. In conclusion, these findings support our theory 














Figure 3 – SEM Results for Direct Paths 
Chi-square=96.43, Chi-square DF=25, Chi-square/DF=3.85, SRMR=0.03, CFI =0.96, NNFI 
=0.94  
(P <.05 *, P<.01 **, P<.001***), N=132 
*All variables are coded in positive direction, meaning that, higher values of cronyism and 
unproductive entrepreneurship variables, respectively, indicate lower levels of cronyism and 
unproductive entrepreneurship in a country.  
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In the second stage, mediators are added to the previous model to test for 
mediation paths. The second model also indicates adequate fit with data (Chi-square/DF 
= 3.15, SRMR = 0.03, CFI = 0.94, NNFI = 0.93). The results show that the direct effect 
of cronyism on UE is still significant (β= 0.54, p-value < 0.001). However, cronyism’s 
direct effect on PE fades away once mediators are added to the analysis (β= 0.01, n.s.), 
which indicates that this path is fully mediated through the study’s suggested mediators. 
As shown in Figure 4, cronyism significantly influences market competition (β= 0.90, p-
value < 0.001), and market competition affects PE (β= 0.63, p-value < 0.001). Similarly, 
cronyism significantly affects institutional trust (β= 0.89, p-value < 0.001), and 
institutional trust influences PE (β= 0.25, p-value < 0.05). These results indicate that 
lower levels of cronyism within a country leads to higher levels of market competition 
and institutional trust in that country, which both promotes higher levels of PE. These 
findings provide strong support for H3(b) and H4(b), respectively. In conclusion, the 
above results show that cronyism has a significant negative influence on PE, and this 
influence is fully mediated through its negative effects on market competition and 
institutional trust.  
The results from second SEM analysis indicate that market competition does not 
mediate the cronyism’s effect on UE. While the relationship between cronyism and 
market competition is negative (β= 0.90, p-value < 0.001), the relationship between 
market competition and UE appears to be positive (β= -0.33, p-value < 0.001). This 
finding means that lower cronyism promotes market competition, and higher market 
competition leads to higher UE. This is exactly opposite to the study’s theory that 
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suggests lower market competition leads to higher UE. In other words, the analysis 
results fail to support H3(a). This finding is further discussed in next chapter.  
Finally, results of the second SEM analysis provide strong support for H4(a). 
Cronyism has a negative significant relationship with institutional trust (β= 0.89, p-value 
< 0.001), and institutional trust has a significant negative relationship with UE (β= 0.75, 
p-value < 0.001). This means that lower levels of cronyism in a country promote higher 
levels of institutional trust, which then leads to lower levels of UE in that country. In 
other words, positive effects of cronyism on UE is partially mediated through its negative 





























Figure 4 – SEM Results for Direct and Mediated Paths 
Chi-square=258.58, Chi-square DF=82, Chi-square/DF=3.15, SRMR=0.03, CFI =0.94, NNFI 
=0.93  
(P <.05 *, P<.01 **, P<.001***), N=132 
*All variables are coded in positive direction, meaning that, higher values of cronyism and 
unproductive entrepreneurship variables, respectively, indicate lower levels of cronyism and 




Several robustness tests were performed to echo the validity of the above 
described results. Firstly, two subject matter experts’ surveys were conducted to 
investigate content validity of the study’s measures (Hinkin, 1995; Schriesheim et al., 
1993). As a common practice, the study used two samples of 20 PhD students and 20 
undergraduate senior students to investigate the extent to which these samples agree that 
the study’s measures can meaningfully reflect the construct they are intended to measure 
(Hill, White, & Wallace, 2013). Both samples were offered a task in which they would 
read the definition for each construct and its corresponding measures, and then determine 
whether they believe that each of the measures reflect the construct’s meaning or not. 
Appendix 1 present the template for the study’s subject matter experts’ survey and Table 
7 represents the results. 










Cronyism  92 83 
 Favoritism in decisions of government officials 95 100 
 Favoritism in appointing managers 100 70 
 Undue influence on judiciary system 80 80 
Market Competition  92 88 
 Intensity of local competition 95 100 
 Effectiveness of anti-monopoly policy 90 80 
 Extent of market dominance 90 85 
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Institutional Trust  90 80 
 Government effectiveness 90 80 
 Rule of law 90 85 
 Regulatory quality 90 75 
Productive Entrepreneurship  75 87 
 Capacity for innovation 75 95 
 Company spending on R&D 75 85 
 PCT patent applications 75 80 
Unproductive Entrepreneurship  78 82 
 Control of corruption 80 85 
 Corruption Perception Index (CPI) 60 80 
 Irregular payments and bribes 95 80 
 As shown in Table 7 most of the study’s measures satisfy the suggested threshold 
level of 80% in both samples (Hill, Kern, & White, 2014), meaning that majority of the 
samples’ participants believe that the study’s measures appropriately reflect the meaning 
of constructs they are intended to measure. An important exception here is PhD students’ 
rating for measures of productive entrepreneurship, which received 75% agreement rate. 
While this is not a major shortcoming (75% compared to 80% threshold), the study 
adopts other common proxies for measurement of productive entrepreneurship at country 
level to address this concern and insure that the study’s main findings are valid.   
Consequently, several regression models are analyzed to further investigate 
validity of results for the main focus of the study, meaning the relationship between 
cronyism and productive entrepreneurship (H2). For this purpose, the study considers 
five other proxies for measuring country-level productive entrepreneurship, including, 
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new business density (number of new business registered divided by population), R&D 
expenditure (as % of GDP), researchers in R&D (per million people), technicians in 
R&D (per million people), and high technology exports (as % of all manufactured 
exports). The relationship between cronyism and these other proxies for PE are 
investigated using regression analysis to find further support for H2.  
The results of five regression models, shown in Table 8, support that cronyism 
has a negative significant influence on PE (using multiple proxies), meaning that lower 
levels of cronyism is associated with higher levels of PE. There is at least a one year lag 
(two years when data available) between cronyism data (IV) and PE proxies (DVs). All 
regression coefficients (βs) are significant (p < 0.01) and their values range from 0.34 to 
0.67, indicating cronyism’s strong effects on PE. According to these regression models, 
the level of cronyism is able to explain, respectively, 11%, 39%, 44%, 19%, and 12% of 
variance in PE, when new business density, R&D expenditure, researchers in R&D, 

































R2 0.12 0.40 0.45 0.21 0.13 
Adjusted R2 0.11 0.39 0.44 0.19 0.12 
F 11.67*** 35.74*** 36.58*** 10.89** 15.92*** 
N 90 55 46 43 112 
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technicians in R&D, and high technology exports are used as PE proxies (R-square for 
regression models). Overall, these results provide further strong support for H2, and 
shows that cronyism’s negative influence on PE is robust for different proxies of PE.         
Additionally, SEM analysis are performed with the base year of 2012, meaning 
that, cronyism’s data for 2012, mediators’ data for 2013, and DVs’ data for 2014. The 
results of this two-stage SEM analysis indicate that the study’s results are fairly robust 
even with the change of the year in the analysis. As shown in Figure 5 and Figure 6, 
goodness of fit and path coefficients’ results for these new models (201220132014) 
are similar to the results of the study’s main models (201120122012), which indicate 
















Figure 5 – Robustness Test Results for Direct Paths 
Chi-square=128.93, Chi-square DF=25, Chi-square/DF=5.15, SRMR=0.04, CFI =0.94, NNFI 
=0.92  
(P <.05 *, P<.01 **, P<.001***), N=135 
*All variables are coded in positive direction, meaning that, higher values of cronyism and 
unproductive entrepreneurship variables, respectively, indicate lower levels of cronyism and 































Figure 6 – Robustness Tests Results for Direct and Mediated Paths 
Chi-square=307.13, Chi-square DF=82, Chi-square/DF=3.75, SRMR=0.04, CFI =0.93, NNFI 
=0.92  
(P <.05 *, P<.01 **, P<.001***), N=134 
*All variables are coded in positive direction, meaning that, higher values of cronyism and 
unproductive entrepreneurship variables, respectively, indicate lower levels of cronyism and 







This study strives to clarify how the levels of productive and unproductive 
entrepreneurship are impacted by the prevalence of cronyism in a country. For this 
purpose, the study adopts Bumol’s (1990) model of productive, unproductive, and 
destructive entrepreneurship and explains how the prevalence of cronyism undermines 
productive entrepreneurship and promotes unproductive entrepreneurship in a society. 
The study posits that cronyism as a practice becomes institutionalized in a context and 
functions either as a cognitive (common/safe path for success) or as a normative (how 
things are getting done around here) institution to influence individuals’ choice of 
behavior. In Baumol’s words, prevalence of cronyism changes the rules of the game such 
that they reward unproductive entrepreneurship more than productive entrepreneurship in 
a society. 
Additionally, this study suggests two mechanisms through which cronyism 
impacts productive and unproductive entrepreneurship. Market competition and 
institutional trust are two mediators that this study focuses on to explain how the 
prevalence of cronyism in a country discourages productive entrepreneurship and 
encourages unproductive entrepreneurship. The study argues that prevalence of cronyism 
dampens market competition and exhausts people’s trust in institutions, which both, lack 
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of market competition and institutional trust, decrease productive entrepreneurship and 
increase unproductive entrepreneurship in a society.  
Empirical analysis of the study’s hypotheses is performed on data from 132 
countries using reliable secondary data sources, including the Global Competitiveness 
Index reported by World Economic Forum (Sala-I-Martin et al., 2010), the Worldwide 
Governance Indicators developed by World Bank Groups (Kaufmann, Kraay, & 
Mastruzzi, 2010), the World Bank Group Entrepreneurship Survey (WBGES), the World 
Development Indicators developed by World Bank Groups, and the Corruption 
Perception Index reported by Transparency International (Lambsdorff, 2008). The 
study’s sample includes underdeveloped, developing, emerging, and developed countries 
from all regions of the world, which assures generalizability of the study’s findings.  
Analysis results strongly support all hypothesized relationships, except for 
mediating role of market competition in cronyism-unproductive entrepreneurship 
relationship. More specifically, empirical findings indicate that the prevalence of 
cronyism has a negative relationship with productive entrepreneurship and this 
relationship is fully mediated through cronyism’s negative effects on market competition 
and institutional trust. Also, the prevalence of cronyism has a positive relationship with 
unproductive entrepreneurship, which is partially mediated through cronyism’s negative 
influence on institutional trust and institutional trust’s negative influence on unproductive 
entrepreneurship. In contrast to this study’s hypothesis, market competition does not 
mediate cronyism’s relationship with unproductive entrepreneurship. Instead, the results 
show that market competition has positive relationship with unproductive 
entrepreneurship, contrary to what is hypothesized in this study.   
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This study argues that prevalence of cronyism results in entry barriers and 
protective regulations in favor of connected firms which undermines market competition. 
Also, the lack of market competition produces rents and leaves firms with excessive 
resources that they can invest in rent seeking behaviors, meaning that, less competitive 
markets promote more unproductive entrepreneurial behaviors to extract different types 
of rents in these markets. Consequently, the study hypothesizes that prevalence of 
cronyism decreases market competition, which then leads to promotion of unproductive 
entrepreneurship. However, the empirical results indicate market competition has a 
positive relationship with unproductive entrepreneurship, meaning that a decrease in 
market competition leads to lower levels of unproductive entrepreneurship.  
An overview of the literature on relationship between market competition and 
corruption is useful to understand these findings, especially considering that this study 
uses a corruption measure as a proxy for unproductive entrepreneurship. Prior research 
suggests that this relationship is a complex phenomenon that depends on various factors, 
including reasons for strength of market competition and specific nature of corruption 
(Bliss & DiTella, 1997; Alexeev & Song, 2013). For instance, “corruption based on the 
extraction of existing rents that are due to some artificial (non-technological) limits on 
competition is likely to flourish in less competitive environments. Also, if competition is 
weak due to excessive regulation, then it might be associated with greater corruption that 
is promoted by this regulation.” (Alexeev & Song, 2013, p. 6). However, “corruption that 
reduces firms’ costs is likely to be promoted by product market competition.” (Alexeev & 
Song, 2013, p. 6). Therefore, the influence of market competition on corruption varies in 
different contexts.  
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Regardless of the fact that this study uses a corruption measure for unproductive 
entrepreneurship, the same arguments apply to the relationship between market 
competition and unproductive entrepreneurship. In other words, the nature of this 
relationship depends on reasons for lack/presence of market competition and specific 
types of/motives for unproductive entrepreneurship. For example, as discussed, low 
levels of market competition due to governmental barriers can promote unproductive 
entrepreneurial efforts, such as political rent seeking or lobbying, (negative relationship 
between competition and UE), however, when market competition is high because of 
natural market competitive forces it can motivate firms to engage in unproductive 
entrepreneurial efforts, such as tax evasions or law suits, that lead to cost-advantageous 
for firms (positive relationship between competition and UE). Therefore, the nature of 
market competition’s effects on unproductive entrepreneurship is mostly an empirical 
issue and differs based on varying contextual factors that influence these variables, and 
also different proxies that are used to measure them (Alexeev & Song, 2013). 
This study contributes to prior research on cronyism in several ways. Firstly, the 
study provides the first comprehensive review of this literature. This review highlights 
the multi-level nature of this body of research. It suggests that cronyism is a multi-level 
phenomenon with micro-, meso-, and macro- level antecedents, and has social, political, 
and economic consequences at different levels of analysis. Consequently, a wide range of 
theoretical frameworks and empirical methods can be adopted to examine cronyism-
related research questions.    
The study focuses on country-level of analysis and chooses an institutional theory 
perspective to study cronyism. It conceptualizes cronyism as an informal institution 
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(whether cognitive or normative) in a society, which is a new addition to prior literature. 
Conceptualization of cronyism as an informal institution in a context provides a rich set 
of institutional theory related frameworks and arguments for researchers interested in 
studying cronyism. For instance, this research adopts Baumol’s (1990) model of 
productive and unproductive entrepreneurship and explains how cronyism, as an informal 
rule of the game, encourages unproductive entrepreneurship at the expense of 
discouraging productive entrepreneurship. 
Moreover, this study suggests a new approach for measuring cronyism by 
building a measure of ‘average perception of prevalence of cronyism’ within a context. 
The study argues that difficulties of making objective judgment about occurrence of 
cronyism suggest that perception of cronyism can be an appropriate proxy for measuring 
cronyism (Smith & Sutter, 2012). A significant contribution of this study is to build a 
measure of perception of cronyism at country-level as a proxy for the degree of 
prevalence of cronyism within a country.  
This study reports a national score for the level of cronyism in countries included 
in the study’s sample based on measures adopted from World Economic Forum’s Global 
Competitiveness report and validated through confirmatory factor analysis. These scores 
and countries’ ranks based on their cronyism scores are presented in Table 9. While these 
cronyism scores have large significant correlations with countries’ GDP per capita (0.72, 
P<.0001) and global competitiveness scores (0.83, p<.0001), it is very difficult to 
conclude that countries’ level of cronyism depends on any single factor, like the level of 
economic development, or wealth. For instance, the existence of developing countries 
such as Qatar (9), Saudi Arabia (17), and Bahrain (20), scoring higher than developed 
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countries such as the US (32), France (34), and Italy (88), in the ranking proposes 
interesting anomalies that call for future research on country-level antecedents and 
consequences of cronyism. This study’s initiatives to develop this measure of cronyism at 
country-level facilitate and instigate future research in this area. 
Table 9 – Ranking of Countries Based on the Level of Cronyism 
Rank Country Country Code Cronyism Score (2011) 
1 Sweden SWE 2.364179 
2 New Zealand NZL 2.273711 
3 Denmark DNK 2.085018 
4 Finland FIN 1.946829 
5 Norway NOR 1.923706 
6 Netherlands NLD 1.904489 
7 Switzerland CHE 1.833269 
8 Singapore SGP 1.820654 
9 Qatar QAT 1.673596 
10 Canada CAN 1.620512 
11 United Kingdom GBR 1.599568 
12 Australia AUS 1.531966 
13 Japan JPN 1.519187 
14 Germany DEU 1.512528 
15 Ireland IRL 1.428579 
16 Luxembourg LUX 1.34825 
17 Saudi Arabia SAU 1.282473 
18 Chile CHL 1.222948 
19 Rwanda RWA 1.204371 
20 Bahrain BHR 1.141683 
21 Iceland ISL 1.141239 
22 Belgium BEL 1.130987 
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23 Israel ISR 1.080697 
24 Barbados BRB 1.015316 
25 Estonia EST 1.005816 
26 United Arab Emirates ARE 0.995422 
27 Austria AUT 0.983584 
28 Oman OMN 0.957466 
29 Malaysia MYS 0.947081 
30 Botswana BWA 0.919324 
31 Gambia GMB 0.77832 
32 United States USA 0.733328 
33 Brunei BRN 0.712244 
34 France FRA 0.694248 
35 Uruguay URY 0.512542 
36 Sri Lanka LKA 0.457333 
37 South Africa ZAF 0.426747 
38 Costa Rica CRI 0.41414 
39 China CHN 0.349385 
40 Malta MLT 0.312363 
41 Cyprus CYP 0.276932 
42 Namibia NAM 0.263492 
43 Mauritius MUS 0.228364 
44 Montenegro MON 0.22503 
45 Malawi MWI 0.168124 
46 Indonesia IDN 0.133135 
47 Spain ESP 0.132495 
48 Poland POL 0.122626 
49 Kuwait KWT 0.110098 
50 Brazil BRA 0.063254 
51 Ghana GHA 0.041553 
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52 Thailand THA -0.01289 
53 India IND -0.01854 
54 Cabo Verde CPV -0.03352 
55 Trinidad and Tobago TTO -0.07222 
56 South Korea KOR -0.08162 
57 Jordan JOR -0.09397 
58 Lithuania LTU -0.10131 
59 Tanzania TZA -0.11538 
60 Zambia ZMB -0.13219 
61 Jamaica JAM -0.14427 
62 Hungary HUN -0.15244 
63 Portugal PRT -0.18002 
64 Latvia LVA -0.21335 
65 Zimbabwe ZWE -0.22114 
66 Morocco MAR -0.22428 
67 Czech Republic CZE -0.22987 
68 Cambodia KHM -0.2383 
69 Iran IRN -0.24071 
70 Nigeria NGA -0.30257 
71 Guyana GUY -0.30609 
72 Suriname SUR -0.31038 
73 Georgia GEO -0.32648 
74 Peru PER -0.32842 
75 Albania ALB -0.33118 
76 Egypt EGY -0.33252 
77 Vietnam VNM -0.3718 
78 Pakistan PAK -0.37407 
79 Swaziland SWZ -0.37803 
80 Mexico MEX -0.3789 
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81 Azerbaijan AZE -0.37994 
82 Colombia COL -0.38018 
83 Turkey TUR -0.41522 
84 Philippines PHL -0.42407 
85 Ethiopia ETH -0.4274 
86 Cameroon CMR -0.47256 
87 Nepal NPL -0.50672 
88 Italy ITA -0.53027 
89 Honduras HND -0.53836 
90 Benin BEN -0.53943 
91 Uganda UGA -0.53974 
92 Kenya KEN -0.54251 
93 Bosnia and Herzegovina BIH -0.54404 
94 Greece GRC -0.5753 
95 Romania ROM -0.62724 
96 Armenia ARM -0.64734 
97 Senegal SEN -0.64735 
98 Guatemala GTM -0.64891 
99 Croatia HRV -0.66381 
100 Mozambique MOZ -0.68841 
101 Timor-Leste TLS -0.72153 
102 Bangladesh BGD -0.72941 
103 Macedonia MKD -0.74095 
104 Bulgaria BGR -0.75038 
105 Lesotho LSO -0.76506 
106 Ecuador ECU -0.76808 
107 Bolivia BOL -0.77451 
108 Kazakhstan KAZ -0.8063 
109 El Salvador SLV -0.81503 
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110 Argentina ARG -0.83613 
111 Russia RUS -0.86105 
112 Mali MLI -0.86671 
113 Burkina Faso BFA -0.87723 
114 Moldova MDA -0.88434 
115 Madagascar MDG -0.88993 
116 Côte d'Ivoire CIV -0.96624 
117 Mongolia MNG -0.98732 
118 Panama PAN -0.9974 
119 Lebanon LBN -1.03406 
120 Ukraine UKR -1.05799 
121 Serbia SCG -1.10358 
122 Venezuela VEN -1.12227 
123 Kyrgyzstan KGZ -1.13284 
124 Algeria DZA -1.16571 
125 Dominican Republic DOM -1.22114 
126 Paraguay PRY -1.24479 
127 Nicaragua NIC -1.25702 
128 Burundi BDI -1.29246 
129 Chad TCD -1.32333 
130 Mauritania MRT -1.36065 
131 Haiti HTI -1.38677 
132 Yemen YEM -1.9328 
Lastly, this study suggests two mechanisms through which cronyism influences 
productive and unproductive entrepreneurship. In the case of productive 
entrepreneurship, it appears that market competition and institutional trust are able to 
fully mediate negative effects of cronyism. While the full mediation results can be due to 
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this study’s specific choice of variables and measures, it may also indicate that other 
mediators for cronyism-productive entrepreneurship link mediate this relationship 
through either of the two major mechanisms explained here. Overall, these results 
underscore the importance of these mechanisms for investigating cronyism’s effects on 
other country-level outcomes in future research.                  
In addition to contributions to cronyism research, this study also contributes in 
filling research gaps at intersections of entrepreneurship with institutional theory and 
network theory. Prior research mainly focused on studying the effects of formal 
institutions, such as property rights and contract enforcement laws, on productive 
entrepreneurship and falls short in studying the effects of informal institutions on 
productive entrepreneurship (Bruton et al., 2010). This study explains how cronyism, as 
an understudied informal institution, creates differences in the levels of productive 
entrepreneurship within countries that may even have more or less similar formal 
institutions. Hence, this study highlights the importance of considering the effects of 
informal institutions on productive entrepreneurship and encourages scholars to focus on 
this understudied area of research. 
Moreover, for many years entrepreneurship has been generally framed as a 
positive phenomenon by scholars because of its known positive effects on economic 
development and prosperity in societies (e.g. Reynolds et al., 1999; Zacharakis et al., 
2000). Such a positive bias toward the entrepreneurship related phenomenon is still 
dominant in entrepreneurship scholarship, despite calls for paying attention to the dark 
sides of entrepreneurship at different levels of analysis (e.g. Baumol, 1990; Hmieleski, & 
Lerner, 2013). This study is one of the few empirical research studies that focuses on 
117  
unproductive entrepreneurship at macro-level and provides support for Baumol’s (1990) 
model of productive, unproductive, and destructive entrepreneurship (e.g. Murphy et 
al.,1991; Sobel, 2008). This study’s theoretical arguments and empirical findings advance 
our knowledge about unproductive forms of entrepreneurial behaviors and highlight a 
critical need for future scholarship in this area. 
Finally, the study highlights an important gap of knowledge at the intersection of 
entrepreneurship and network theory, which requires scholars’ further attention. For 
many years, scholars focused on studying positive roles of networking for entrepreneurial 
entry and business performance. Having social networks (whether dense networks of 
strong ties or sparse networks of weak ties with many structural holes) is known to 
provide competitive advantages for firms and supports entrepreneurial growth in almost 
every context (Burt, 1992; Coleman, 1988, 1990; Singh et al., 1999). Recent findings 
even suggest that social networks can substitute for lack of well-functioning formal 
institutions, especially in the developing countries’ context (e.g. Puffer et al., 2010). In 
contrast, there are relatively very few studies on the “downside of social networking” or 
cronyism in management and entrepreneurship scholarship (Khatri et al., 2003).  
This study demonstrates that prevalence of certain types of networking activities, 
called cronyism, can be detrimental to productive entrepreneurship in a society as a 
whole. In other words, this study does not reject scholars’ general belief that having 
informal networks helps an entrepreneur to pursue his goals at the 
individual/organizational level, but it further clarifies that once having informal networks 
becomes an excessively important success factor for businesses in a country, then the 
level of productive entrepreneurship is influenced negatively at the national level. Hence, 
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this current research focuses on negative effects of too much networking for 






Implications for Policy Makers and Entrepreneurs 
Entrepreneurship policy makers aim to set the rules of the game in a country such 
that they promote the supply and allocation of resources to productive entrepreneurship. 
This study explains how cronyism can suppress these goals by decreasing supply of 
resources to productive entrepreneurship through undermining individuals’ 
entrepreneurial intentions, also by promoting allocation of resources to unproductive 
entrepreneurship through changing reward structure in a society. Therefore, policy 
makers need to find ways to fight against cronyism and its destructive effects on 
entrepreneurship policies and programs.  
Policy makers are required to set policies that decrease opportunities for 
occurrence of cronyism in a business context. For instance, developing more transparent 
procedures with rules that leave less room for subjective judgments of officials who 
enforce these rules can reduce the level of preferential treatments for connected 
individuals (Fei et al., 2012). Moreover, policy makers need to focus on suppressing two 
mediating mechanisms suggested in this study in order to weaken the effects of cronyism 
on productive entrepreneurship. Based on this study’s findings, setting and enforcing  
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policies that strengthen market competitions and attract citizens’ trust in fairness 
and functionality of the system are effective ways to hamper the negative effects of 
cronyism on productive entrepreneurship. 
Additionally, entrepreneurs need to consider the destructive long term effects of 
engagement in cronyism. While involvement in cronyism can benefit entrepreneurs in the 
short term, it has major costs for them in the long term. Most importantly, entrepreneurs’ 
reliance on preferential treatments they receive through their connections makes them 
short term oriented and unwilling to plan for investments on developing sustainable 
competitive advantages that help them to survive in the long run (Enderwick, 2005). In 
other words, entrepreneurs who have access to favors through their connections get 
distracted from investing in their own core competencies and ultimately suffer from their 
incompetence in the long-term, especially in cases of connection terminations or major 
political changes that destroy their connections’ value (Duchin & Sosyura, 2012; Tahoun, 
2014; Su et al., 2015).   
Moreover, once an entrepreneur participates in cronyism and seeks rents through 
favors, his rent seeking behavior not only produces a negative externality on productive 
entrepreneurs, but also reduces the return to rent seeking in his society (Acemoglu, 1995). 
In other words, an entrepreneur’s involvement in cronyism may seem to have short term 
benefits for the individual entrepreneurs, but in long term it contributes to changing 
reward structure in the society and reduces the return to both productive and 
unproductive entrepreneurship for current and future generations. Consequently, when 
entrepreneurs decide to participate in cronyism, they need to consider that they contribute 
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in making entrepreneurship, both productive and unproductive, less rewarding in society 
as a whole, which ultimately hurts themselves as well as other citizens.    
Future Research Directions 
Scholarly research on cronyism, especially in management and entrepreneurship 
disciplines, is in its infancy stage. Although prior research on political connections’ 
influence on firm’s performance tangentially informs scholars about some of the firm-
level consequences of cronyism (e.g. Zhou, 2013), there are still wide areas of research 
on cronyism-related phenomenon that remain untouched. Most importantly, the cronyism 
concept requires more theoretical clarifications and empirical investigations. So far, very 
few studies, including this one, focused on clarifying the concept of cronyism and its 
different types in the literature (e.g. Khatri et al. 2006; Henderson, 2012; Holcombe, 
2013). However, further theoretical development and understanding in this area would be 
limited without the proper definition of this concept and clarification of its boundaries. 
This study conceptualizes cronyism as an informal institution in a society. Future 
research is required to explain how the practice of cronyism becomes institutionalized in 
a context and what other factors, including other formal/informal institutions, 
accelerate/strengthen the institutionalization of cronyism in a context. In other words, our 
knowledge about (micro-, meso-, and macro-level) antecedents of cronyism is very 
limited and more scholarship is required to understand why cronyism is more prevalent in 
some contexts than others. The multi-level multi-disciplinary nature of these antecedents 
enable scholars from different areas of knowledge (e.g. psychology, sociology, 
economics, politics) to be able to establish fruitful research streams in this area. 
122  
A few examples of research questions for future studies on the antecedents of 
cronyism include: what individual characteristics increase the propensity of individuals to 
engage in cronyism? What is the relationship between individuals’ ethical standards and 
their propensity for engagement in cronyism? What organizational characteristics can 
promote organizational members’ involvement in cronyism within firms? How do firms’ 
degrees of familiness influence the occurrence of cronyism within those firms? What 
social norms and values promote cronyism in a society? How do different types of 
institutional imperfections in countries influence their level of cronyism?    
Similarly, cronyism’s consequences require more scholarly attention. Cronyism 
has a variety of social, political, and economic consequences, which calls for 
multidisciplinary research streams that aim to examine cronyism’s relationships with 
these consequences and investigate the mechanisms through which cronyism influence its 
outcomes. However, the empirical investigations of cronyism-related phenomenon is 
limited until future research focuses on the development of appropriate measurement 
tools for capturing variability of cronyism in different contexts. 
A few examples of questions that future researchers may choose to focus on for 
investigation of cronyism’s effects and outcomes include: What types of emotional and 
behavioral reactions do different individuals have when they are victims or witnesses of 
cronyism? What is the relationship between the prevalence of cronyism in a context and 
individuals’ entrepreneurial intentions and aspirations? How does the occurrence of 
cronyism within organizations influence firm-level outcomes? How do effects of intra-
organizational cronyism on firm’s performance change over time? How do economic 
consequences of cronyism change over time as a country passes through different stages 
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of economic development? What is the relationship between the prevalence of cronyism 
and the level of social inequality in different societies?        
Additionally, unproductive entrepreneurship is an understudied area of research. 
It is quite surprising that entrepreneurship scholarship have been so focused on 
productive forms of entrepreneurship that its unproductive forms have remained 
understudied for more than three decades. Future research is required to investigate the 
relationship between productive and unproductive forms of entrepreneurship, their 
similarities and differences, and the motives for unproductive entrepreneurship at 
different levels of analysis. However, advancement of our knowledge about unproductive 
entrepreneurship depends heavily on future researchers’ attempts to firstly clarify its 
definition, boundaries, and different types, and secondly, develop appropriate 
measurement tools to capture its variability at different levels of analysis.         
A few examples of research questions for future research on unproductive 
entrepreneurship includes: How can prior knowledge on productive entrepreneurship and 
rent-seeking behaviors increase our understanding about unproductive entrepreneurship? 
What individual characteristics increase the propensity of individuals involvement in 
unproductive entrepreneurship rather than productive entrepreneurship? How do 
individuals’ motives differ for involvement in unproductive entrepreneurship compared 
to productive entrepreneurship? Do most entrepreneurs engage in some level of both 
types of entrepreneurship? If yes, how do they balance their resource investments on 
productive and unproductive entrepreneurship? What firm-level capabilities and 
characteristics promote firm-level unproductive entrepreneurial behaviors? What firm-
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level factors influence firms’ allocation of resources between productive and 
unproductive entrepreneurial behaviors?  
In conclusion, this study encourages a wide variety of future research on both 
cronyism and unproductive entrepreneurship, as both concepts have attracted negligible 
attention in prior management and entrepreneurship research. Hence, there are significant 
gaps of knowledge in both areas, which urge future scholarships.     
Limitations 
This study’s data is based on perceptual measures adopted from reliable 
secondary data sources. Several reasons make this choice of perceptual measures 
appropriate for the study’s purpose. Firstly, perceptions matter as people’s choice of 
behavior/action is based on their perceptions of reality, rather than the objective reality 
itself (Kaufmann et al., 2010). For instance, citizens choose to engage in unproductive 
rather than productive entrepreneurship based on their perceptions of return to each path. 
Similarly, institutional trust is based on people’s perceptions of fairness and functionality 
of the system, rather than its objective fairness and functionality. Secondly, in cases such 
as corruption, unproductive entrepreneurship, and cronyism, perceptual measures are 
appropriate alternatives to other available objective measures, since by definition there is 
no objective record for these types of activities (e.g., Lambsdorff, 2008). For instance, as 
discussed previously, no one can be accused of committing cronyism in a court, and 
unproductive entrepreneurs mostly strive to perform their actions under the radar. 
Finally, in cases such as formal institutions or market competition, some objective 
or fact-based data may be available, however such data often captures de jure notion of 
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the desired variables, rather than de facto reality, which is captured by perception data 
(Kaufmann et al., 2010). For instance, ‘on the books’, entry barriers (e.g. measured by 
number of required licenses and permissions) can determine de jure level of market 
competition, which can be quite different than, ‘on the ground’, de facto level market 
competition that is perceived by an entrepreneur who considers entering that market. 
Overall, use of perceptual measures is strongly defendable in this study, especially 
considering its country-level of analysis. However, concerns about probable imprecision 
of perceptual measures and existence of different types of biases in perceptual databases 
are undeniable. This study acknowledges this limitation and encourages future 
researchers to examine similar relationships using objective proxies to the extent 
possible.  
Additionally, using corruption measures as proxies for unproductive 
entrepreneurship is a clear limitation of this study. Prior research fails to suggest 
appropriate objective proxies for measurement of unproductive entrepreneurship. Also, to 
the author’s knowledge, perception-based measures of unproductive entrepreneurship are 
not available. Hence, this study uses the level of country’s perceived corruption as a 
proxy for measuring the level of unproductive entrepreneurship. Unproductive 
entrepreneurial behaviors are mostly perceived as corrupt behaviors by the general 
population; however, not all types of corrupt behaviors (e.g., bribery, embezzlement) are 
unproductive entrepreneurship. Therefore, this is a serious limitation of this study, which 
urges future researchers to develop/adopt more accurate proxies for measuring 
unproductive entrepreneurship in their studies.   
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Finally, low sample size and inadequate number of available years in current data 
did not allow this study to investigate longitudinal models or implement panel data 
analysis. However, this area of knowledge would significantly benefit from longitudinal 
analysis of these variables to understand how the level and influence of cronyism on 
entrepreneurship changes over time within countries. Considering that World Economic 
Forum and World Bank Groups release new version of the data used in this study every 
year, I strongly encourage future scholars to revisit these data sources and assess the 
possibility of performing longitudinal analysis in this area.    
Concluding marks 
For several decades, management scholarship have mostly focused on networking 
and its positive effects on entrepreneurial behaviors and business performance. However, 
scholars have rarely acknowledged negative effects of the prevalence of too much 
networking, or the downside of networking, in a business context. The current study 
highlights this issue by conceptualizing cronyism as an informal institution that is able to 
discourage productive entrepreneurial behaviors and encourage unproductive ones. 
Whenever individuals offer unfair favors to members of their networks at the expense of 
non-members, they contribute in disrupting market competitions, destroying people’s 
trust in the system, and ultimately developing a system in which connections play critical 
roles for achievement of goals rather than qualifications and hard work. Such an unfair 
economic system generally is called crony capitalism.  
Countries that fall into the “idea trap” of cronyism, as a pragmatic way of getting 
business done, find their private and public resources locked into a crony capitalism 
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system in long run. As cronyism become more institutionalized it leads to more cronyism 
and ultimately these countries fall into a reinforcing vicious cycle that is able to 
destroy/obliterate their whole economy. This is an ‘underdevelopment trap’ that many 
countries are locked in currently (Acemoglu, 1995). Therefore, it is vital that scholars 
initiate more research on cronyism to understand and identify its antecedents, 
consequences, and mechanisms through which it is reinforced. I hope future research 
form a rich body of knowledge that is able to offer practical suggestions for policy 
makers and entrepreneurs on how to fight against the “idea trap” of cronyism in societies 
and contribute in building favor-free and fair business contexts. This research is a step 
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